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THE  YEAR  1971 SAW  A MAJOR  realignment of exchange rates among the 
world's  important  currencies.  The basic cause of these changes  was the 
continuing  deterioration  of the U.S. trade  and  payments  position,  and  their 
proximate  cause  the massive  speculation  against  the dollar  throughout  the 
year  and suspension  of convertibility  by the United States  in August.  The 
changes  in exchange  rates against  the dollar-the  dollar price of foreign 
currencies-are expected  to initiate  a major swing  toward  surplus  in the 
U.S. trade  balance  and consequently  to reduce  substantially  the surpluses 
of some other  countries. 
This paper  attempts  to provide  reasonable  and consistent  estimates  of 
the effects  of the realignment  on the trade  balances  of the major  countries, 
based  on current  knowledge  of the theoretical  and empirical  relationships 
involved.  No  new empirical  evidence  is produced  here; I try rather  to 
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Economics. Polly R. Allen, Dwight M. Jaffee, and Lawrence  J. White are due special 
thanks. In addition,  Paul S. Armington,  Helen B. Junz, and members  of and senior  ad- 
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present  a coherent  picture  of the state of the art regarding  both the ana- 
lytics  and empirical  estimates  of the effects  of exchange  rate  changes,  and 
to give my best guess  concerning  the outcome. 
In the first  two major  sections  of the paper  the analytics  of revaluation 
are discussed,  first from the point of view of a single revaluing  country, 
with attention  to the difficulties  concerning  export  supply  elasticities  and 
the "pass-through"  issue; and then from the standpoint  of multilateral 
trade,  using  a model originally  developed  by Paul  Armington.1 
The next three  sections  focus on quantitative  estimates  of the long-run 
effects  of the realignment.  The first  reports  an extension  of the Armington 
model,  under  several  assumptions  about  the relevant  demand,  substitution, 
and supply  elasticities;  it develops  a figure  of a bit less than $8 billion for 
the swing  in the U.S. trade  surplus  from a 1971  base, and consistent  esti- 
mates for the whole trade matrix.  Next comes a brief discussion  of the 
empirical  model for U.S. bilateral  trade developed  by Stephen  Magee, 
which  provides  estimates  of the U.S. row and column  of the world  trade 
matrix.2  It also shows a swing of about $8 billion, although  it implies  a 
somewhat  different  distribution  of U.S. gains across.  bilateral  balances. 
Then some empirical  estimates  are presented  of the effects on the total 
trade  balances  of seven  of the major  countries  from  the trade  model  of the 
Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and Development  (OECD),  de- 
veloped  by F. G. Adams  and his associates.3  This model  predicts  the row 
and column  sums  of the world  trade  matrix-total exports  and imports- 
for the seven major OECD countries  and two residual  categories,  and 
although  it gives a lower  estimate  of the general  level of effects,  it yields a 
further  check on the distribution  of effects  across  major  countries. 
None of the models  used  in these  three  sections  is useful  for studying  the 
timing  of the effects;  Armington's  is explicitly  comparative  static;  Magee's 
uses annual  data with no price lags; and Adams'  relies on semi-annual 
1. See  Paul S. Armington,  "ATheory  of Demand  for Products  Distinguished  by Place 
of Production," International  Monetary Fund (IMF), Staff Papers, Vol. 16 (March 
1969),  pp. 159-76, and further  references  cited in note 10 below. 
2. See Stephen P. Magee, "United States Trade and the New Economic Policy," 
Studies  in International  Business  and Economics  9 (University  of California,  Berkeley, 
Institute  of International  Studies,  September  1971;  processed),  and further  references  in 
note 21 below. 
3. See F.  G.  Adams, H.  Eguchi, and F.  Meyer-zu-Schlochtern,  An Econometric 
Analysis  of International  Trade  (Paris: Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and 
Development,  January  1969),  and note 27 below for a further  reference. William H. Branson  17 
data  with  at most one half-year  lag. So the sixth  section  reviews  briefly  the 
evidence  on timing.  What  little evidence  there  is suggests  lags of at most 
two years if the exchange  rate changes are immediately  passed on in 
changes  in export  prices  stated  in the  importer's  currency,  and  substantially 
longer  if they  are  not. The  paper  ends  with  some  brief  conclusions  from  my 
survey  of the existing  literature. 
Two crucial  aspects  of the estimates  here  deserve  note.  First,  they do not 
predict  changes  in actual trade  balances.  Rather,  they give the partial,  or 
differential,  outcome  of the realignments  a few years  hence compared  to 
what would otherwise  have resulted.  For example,  an estimate  of a $7 
billion swing  in the U.S. trade  balance  is not a prediction  that the actual 
balance  will change  by $7 billion over some base period,  but instead  that 
after, say, 1973, the surplus  will be $7 billion higher  at any given time 
than it would  have been under  the exchange  rates  of April 30, 1971. 
Second, the estimates  are the "exogenous"  or "initial"  effects of the 
realignment,  before  any compensating  effects  working  through  income  or 
the general  price  level  set in. On one interpretation,  these  estimates  give  the 
final  results  if governments  act to prevent  a net effect  on income  and price 
levels. Such action is unlikely,  at least in the United States, where the 
stimulus  to income  will be welcome  even though  it will increase  imports 
and  dilute  the initial  impact  of the change.  On a second  interpretation,  the 
estimates  are the exogenous  changes  in net exports  to be fed into macro- 
economic  models  that will then  calculate  the feedbacks  for whatever  path 
is assumed  for government  policy variables. 
The Basic  Analytics  of Revaluation 
The effects  of a revaluation  on the export  receipts  and import  payments 
of a typical  country  other  than the United States,  in dollar  terms,  can be 
analyzed  in a straightforward  fashion  with  reference  to a set of supply-and- 
demand diagrams  borrowed  from Charles  Kindleberger  and shown in 
Figure 1.4  They assume that both suppliers  and demanders  state their 
schedules  in their own currencies,  with the exchange  rate r (equal  to dol- 
lars per unit of foreign  currency)  translating  between  the two. The initial 
equilibrium  values  of imports  and  exports,  in dollars  and  in home  currency, 
4. Charles  P. Kindleberger,  International  Economics(3rd  ed., Richard  D. Irwin,  1963), 
p. 165. 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Figure  1.  Effects  of Revaluation  on Imports  and Exports  of a Typical 
Country  other than the United  States,  in Dollar  and Home 
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Source: Adapted from Charles  P. Kindleberger,  Initernational  Economkcs(3rd  ed., Richard D. Irwin, 1963), 
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are given  by the intersections  of the supply  and demand  curves  with zero 
subscripts. 
To reveal  the effects  of a revaluation  in dollar  terms,  the pair of graphs 
on the left in Figure 1 uses as an example  a revaluation  of the deutsche 
mark  (DM), whose dollar  value rises  from $0.275  to $0.310.  In terms of 
dollars,  this process  has  no effect  on the supply  of imports  to Germany  but 
it shifts  the German  demand  curve  up by the percentage  of the revaluation 
to D1. From the German  point of view, an item worth  one DM has risen 
in value from 271/2, to 31 ,.  Similarly, the U.S. demand function for Ger- 
man exports  is fixed  in dollars,  but if German  supply  is set in DM, the 
dollar supply  curve  shifts  left to S,. 
The result  is unambiguous  for dollar import  payments  by Germany- 
plainly,  they rise-but  not for dollar  export  receipts.  If the short-run  de- 
mand curve for German  exports is inelastic  at the initial equilibrium, 
export  receipts  in dollars  may even rise.5 
In terms  of the currency  of the revaluing  country,  the situation  is just 
reversed.  German  demand  for imports  is fixed  in DM, while the revalua- 
tion shifts  the supply  curve  down.  On the other  hand,  the U.S. demand  for 
German  goods is fixed in dollar terms, so the U.S. demand  function  in 
DM shifts  down. German  export  receipts  in DM drop unequivocally  but 
import  payments  are subject  to ambiguity. 
THE ROLE OF SUPPLY  ELASTICITIES 
With Germany  still the example,  the extent of the increase  in import 
payments  in dollars that would follow from a revaluation  of the DM 
against  the dollar  obviously  depends  on the elasticities  of both the supply 
of exports  to Germany  and the German  demand  for imports.6  If in the 
upper left graph the elasticity  of supply were infinite,  so that So were 
horizontal,  the increase  in dollar  import  payments  by Germany  would  be 
larger  the greater  the elasticity  of demand,  in absolute  value.  In fact, the 
5. The symmetrically  opposite  possibility  is that if the short-run  U.S. import  demand 
function is inelastic, U.S. import expenditures  in dollars will rise in the short run as a 
result  of the general  foreign  revaluation,  or dollar  devaluation. 
6. The results below can, of course, be derived algebraically  by manipulation  of a 
model such as that set forth below in note 7. For an extension  to the complete  elasticity 
condition giving the effect of a revaluation  on the trade  balance-the  famous Marshall- 
Lerner condition-see  Egon Sohmen, "The Marshall-Lerner  Condition," in Kindle- 
berger,  Itiernzationtal  Econonoics,  Appendix  D, pp. 656-58. 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
percentage  increase  in payments  would, in that case, be equal  to the per- 
centage  revaluation  times  the elasticity  of demand. 
The elasticity  of demand governs  the effect that reducing  the supply 
elasticity  has on imports.  If the demand  elasticity  is less than  unity,  a lower 
supply elasticity,  raising  dollar prices of imports,  will make the rise in 
import  payments  even larger.  If demand  is elastic,  a reduction  in supply 
elasticity  will reduce  the amount  by which  import  payments  rise. 
The lower left graph  suggests  that the dollar value of German  export 
receipts  will rise  or fall in response  to a revaluation  depending  on whether 
the elasticity  of foreign  demand  for German  exports  is greater  or less than 
unity. If export  demand  is elastic  at the initial  Po, Qo intersection,  export 
receipts  in dollar  terms  will fall. 
Again,  the effect  of a lower  supply  elasticity  of German  exports  depends 
on the elasticity  of demand.  A reduction  in supply  elasticity  from  the flat 
So and Si curves  to the steeper  So and S' curves  in the lower  left panel 
holds down the increase  in the dollar price of German  exports.  That in 
turn reduces  the effect  on export  receipts  in absolute  value; but whether 
this implies  an arithmetic  increase  or decrease  depends  on the elasticity  of 
demand.  If demand  is elastic,  so that receipts  fall, a lower  supply  elasticity 
reduces  the decrease. 
Thus if, in general,  both import and export demand functions  have 
elasticities  greater  than unity in absolute  value at the initial equilibrium 
point, a reduction  in the elasticity  of supply  from an infinite  value to a 
smaller  positive value will, by raising  dollar import  prices  and reducing 
dollar export  prices,  blunt the effect of revaluation  on the trade  balance 
of the typical non-U.S. country  in dollar terms. It will mean both less 
decrease  in export  receipts  and less increase  in import  payments. 
AN  ESTIMATE OF THE SUPPLY  EFFECT 
An explicit  adjustment  for the extent  to which  imperfectly  elastic  supply 
schedules  reduce  the ratios of effects  on export  receipts  and import  pay- 
ments  to the percentage  revaluation  is required  for the quantitative  esti- 
mates  developed  below. Imperfectly  elastic  supply  exerts  upward  pressure 
on import  prices  and  downward  pressure  on export  prices  in the revaluing 
country.  Thus  one convenient  way  to make  a supply  adjustment  is to esti- 
mate  the effective  price  change  that follows  from  revaluation. 
Extending  the supply-and-demand  model  discussed  just above  yields  an William H. Branson  21 
expression relating the percentage foreign revaluation, or U.S. devaluation, 
dr/r,  to  the percentage change in foreign export prices, or U.S.  import 
prices, both in dollar terms, dp/p: 
dp/p  1 
dr/r  I -d.s.' 
where d.  and s.  are, respectively, the demand and supply elasticities of 
foreign exports, shown in the lower left-hand graph of  Figure  1.7  This 
relationship has been used to construct Table 1, which shows the ratio of 
price change to revaluation for selected values of d. and sx. 
Table 1 demonstrates that at demand elasticities in the range of -2.0  to 
-3.0,  a supply elasticity in the range of 5.0 to 10.0 suggests ratios of dp/p 
to dr/r  that run between 63 percent and 83 percent. The only econometric 
estimates of trade supply elasticities that I have found are those of Stephen 
P. Magee, who obtained values of 10.0 for U.S. exports, and 8.5 for U.S. 
imports.8 
Combined with  Magee's supply elasticity estimates, demand elastici- 
7. This result  can be derived  from  a log-linear  model, based  on constant  elasticities  of 
supply and demand, for the typical revaluing  country as follows, where  p is price and 
q is quantity: 
Demand:  lnp =  lnao -  allnq. 
Supply:  lnp = lnbo  +  bllnq. 
Here the elasticity  of demand,  d =  -  l/a,;  of supply,  s =  1/Ib. Subscripts  x and m will 
be used  to denote exports  or imports. 
If the model is interpreted  as determining  import payments  in dollars, a revaluation 
shifts  the demand  curve up and can be represented  by dao/ao.  Total differentiation  of the 
two equations,  holding  bo constant, then yields 
dp  dao  dao  1 
p  ao  +  -i  ao  l-  i 
On the export side, the equivalent  expression  is 
dp  dbo /  1  dbo /  d \ 
p  bo  \1+  b  bo  \  z 
a,  sx 
The sum of the two coefficients  of dao/ao  and dbo/bo  is unity,  so that if, for example,  a 10 
percent  devaluation  raises import prices  2 percent,  it will raise export prices 8 percent, 
yielding the supply adjustment  described  in the text. 
8. See Stephen  P. Magee, "A Theoretical  and Empirical  Examination  of Supply  and 
Demand Relationships  in U.S. International  Trade,"  A Study for the Council of Eco- 
nomic Advisers  (October  1970; mimeo.),  Part I, p. 5, for U.S. total exports,  and p. 8 and 
Table  9 for U.S. total imports,  where  the elasticity  is the inverse  of the coefficient  0. 118  of 
QM (quantity  of U.S. imports)  in the total supply equation. 22  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Table  1. Ratio  of Foreign  Export  or U.S. Import  Price Change  to 
Percentage  Revaluation  in Dollar  Terms,  by Selected  Elasticities  of 
Demand  and  Supply 
Elasticities  of demand 
Elasticities 
of supply  -1.0  -2.0  -3.0  -5.0  -10.0 
1.0  0.50  0.33  0.25  0.17  0.09 
2.0  0.67  0.50  0.40  0.29  0.17 
5.0  0.83  0.71  0.63  0.50  0.33 
10.0  0.91  0.83  0.77  0.67  0.50 
0o  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Source: Derived by author; see text for equation and discussion. 
ties in the range from 2.0 to 3.0, which are employed  below, suggest  an 
effective revaluation correction ranging from 0.72 when Sm  =  8.5, dm  =  3.0, 
to about  0.83 when  Sm  =  10.0, dm  =  -2.0.  A correction  of this order  will 
be used in connection  with the Armington  model of bilateral  trade  bal- 
ances. For example,  a demand  elasticity  of -2.2  coupled  with a supply 
elasticity  of 9.0 would yield an effective  revaluation  ratio of 0.8, and a 
supply  elasticity  adjustment  factor  of 0.2, a convenient  central  value. 
THE  "PASS-THROUGH"  ISSUE 
Some argue  that because  exporters  might not, in the immediate  after- 
math,  pass through  the effects  of the revaluation  by changing  their  prices 
in foreign  currency,  but might instead absorb  the change  in margins  on 
foreign  sales, the supply  and demand  shifts depicted  in Figure  1 may not 
occur  at all.9  As an example,  consider  an exporter  in the revaluing  country. 
If he does not raise  his price, exports  will not drop, given  the foreign  de- 
mand  curve. 
But such a response  is likely  to be only temporary.  Losses  in the export 
industry  should eventually push capital and labor out of the industry, 
constricting  output,  pulling  up the price,  and reducing  export  sales. Con- 
versely,  the exporters  in a devaluing  country-in 1971,  the United  States- 
9. The symmetrically  opposite case of U.K. exporters  not cutting prices  and passing 
through  the effects  of the 1967  devaluation  was suggested  in "The  Economic  Situation," 
National  Institute  Economic  Review,  No. 42 (November 1967),  p. 6. The likelihood  that 
foreign  sellers  in the United States  would not raise  prices  and U.S. sellers  abroad  would 
not reduce prices in foreign currencies  has been discussed frequently  in the past few 
months. See "After the Fall," Wall  Street  Journal,  April 19, 1972, p. 1. William  H. Branson  23 
may resist  a decline  in the foreign  exchange  price of their goods, letting 
profits  on foreign  sales  swell  as a result  of the devaluation.  But eventually, 
in the absence  of overwhelming  barriers,  such  profits  should  draw  entrants 
into the industry,  causing the quantity to  increase gradually  through 
changes  in the number  of firms,  rather  than immediately  through  the out- 
put of existing  firms. 
Thus  whether  or not the exchange  rate  change  is passed  through  governs 
mainly  the timing  of its effect.  Immediate  pass-through  will mean  relatively 
short lags, while attempts  to absorb  the effects  of a change  will lengthen 
the lags considerably.  We will return  to these matters  below in a review 
of the evidence  on lags, after  some  more  attention  to the framework  of the 
analysis  and a look at some estimates  of the long-run  effects  of the recent 
exchange  rate  changes. 
A Framework  for Analyzing  Multilateral  Trade  Effects 
A single exchange  rate change  will, in general,  have an effect on each 
cell of a trade matrix  Tij, where  the i rows run across sellers and the j 
columns run across buyers.  The ij entry in such a matrix,  as shown in 
Table  2, gives  the sales  by the ith country  to the  jth country.  With  a change 
in the exchange  rate  or price  level in country  k, an estimate  of the change 
in trade DTij should in theory be possible, with the kth row of  DTi3 
generated  by direct  elasticities  of demand  for k's exports,  and the other 
elements  in DTij  generated  by cross-price  elasticities  of the  j buyers  for the 
goods of the non-k sellers. 
Estimation  of such a model would  ensure  consistency  in the prediction 
of the effects  of exchange  rate  changes.  This is true  because,  excluding  the 
diagonal  elements-which show each country's  purchases  from  itself-the 
columns  must  add up to each country's  change  in total imports;  the rows 
must  sum  to the changes  in total exports;  and,  aggregated  across  countries, 
these two sums must be equal if the model is closed. In addition,  this 
model would  give us a more  detailed  view of the effects  on trade  than the 
usual one-country  bilateral  models, or the models  yielding  only the row 
and column  totals. 
While  an empirical  implementation  of this model  has not yet been pub- 
lished,  the theoretical  basis  for it, and the restrictive  assumptions  that are 
needed  to make it operational,  have been developed  by Paul Armington 24  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1972 
in three  articles  in recent  IMF Staff Papers.'0 It provides  the framework 
for the quantitative  estimates  of the effects  of recent  exchange  rate  changes 
discussed  below. 
THE  ARMINGTON  MODEL 
The Armington  model  in the version  used  here  assumes  that purchasers 
j=  1, . ..  , J) demand a single tradeable commodity Xi  and a single non- 
traded  good X2. For the tradeable  good they distinguish  among sources 
of supply i(=  1, . . . , I) so that, for example, German and Japanese goods 
are not perfect  substitutes.1'  Next Armington  assumes  that the distribu- 
tion of demand  within  each commodity  is independent  of changes  in the 
distribution  within  each other  commodity,  which  allows him to write  the 
demand  functions  of a typical  purchaser  j for traded  goods Xi as 
(1  )  X1 =  Xl(YPl,P2).12 
Here  X1  is defined  as a quantity  index  of purchases  of tradeable  goods  from 
each source: 
(2)  X1 = f(X11,X12,  ...  ).  13 
The  prices  P1 and  P2 are  weighted  averages  of the prices  from  each  supplier 
such that for each purchaserj 
dP  I =  E  PSi  (2a)  s,dl 
10. See "A Theory  of Demand for Products  Distinguished  by Place of Production"; 
"The  Geographic  Pattern  of Trade  and the Effects  of Price  Changes,"  IMF, StaffPapers, 
Vol. 16  (July 1969),  pp. 179-99; "Adjustment  of Trade  Balances:  Some  Experiments  with 
a Model of Trade Among Many Countries,"  IMF, Staff Papers, Vol. 17 (November 
1970), pp. 488-523. The theoretical  results  discussed  here are developed  in "Theory  of 
Demand," while the quantitative  estimates in the next section are extensions of the 
"Geographic  Pattern"  paper.  I understand  that work  on empirical  implementation  of the 
model is going forward  at the IMF. 
11. Note that in general  I = J since all countries  buy and sell. 
12. In this section I am concerned  mainly  with the demand  of a '*typical"  purchaserj 
for tradeable  products  X1ii-goods X1 distinguished  by source  of supply i. To minimize 
multiple  subscripting,  I will omit the] subscript  as long as the focus is on the typical  pur- 
chaser.  Later,  when  this model is used  to analyze  trade  among many  countries,  thej sub- 
script  will be reintroduced. 
13. The assumption  of independence  is required  for aggregation  across  suppliers  and 
separation  of the problem  into the two steps that follow. This is well known from the 
literature  on aggregation.  See Robert M. Solow, "The Production Function and the 
Theory of Capital," Review  of Economic  Studies, Vol. 23 (1955-56), pp. 101-08; and 
Franklin M.  Fisher, "The Existence of  Aggregate Production Functions," Econo- 
rnetrica,  Vol. 37 (October 1969),  pp. 553-77. William H. Branson  25 
The weights  Si are the shares  of each seller i in total demand  of j  for 
tradeable  goods. 
With  the assumption  of independence,  the demand  for tradeable  goods 
breaks  down  into two parts.  Given  money  income Y and  the price  indexes 
of Xi and X2, purchasers  determine  demand  for tradeable  goods from  (1). 
Within  the given purchases  of tradeable  goods the buyer  will distribute 
his demand  across  sellers  i according  to their relative  prices.  To simplify 
the model, Armington  assumes  that the elasticity  of substitution  in each 
buyer's  distribution  function  f(  ) between  suppliers  of X1, oj, is constant 
and has the same  value  for each pair of sources  of tradeable  goods. Thus 
the distribution  functionf( ) for each  buyer  j in equation  (2) is given  by the 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution  (CES)  form 
Xi  =  [bl  Xli  +  ?  *+  b?Ib  X  1P. 
In this case, the distribution  function  across  sellers  is 
(3)  =  bI  i 
where aj, the elasticity of substitution, is given by 17(1  +  p/).(4 
Equations  (1), determining  X1, and (3), distributing  it among  suppliers, 
yield a complete  model of demand  by the typical  buyer  j  for tradeable 
goods X1  by source  of supply.  To determine  the effect  of price,  or exchange 
rate,  changes  on demand  for X1i,  (1) and  (3) can be differentiated,  holding 
Y and P2 constant.  With some manipulation,  this yields for each pur- 
chaser  j, 
(4)  =  -  [(1 -  Si)j  +  SijjdP  S(O  d  Pi  xlij  pli  ~~~kp!i  P1k' 
where  -j is the own-price  elasticity  of demand  for commodity  1 by pur- 
chaser j.15 
14. Equation  (3) can be obtained by partially  differentiating  (2) with respect  to X1i, 
setting  the differential  equal to Pi/iPl,  and solving for Xli/X1. 
15. Differentiating  (3) for Xii yields 
dX1,  dXI  (dPji  dPi) 
xli  Xi  Pi  P1i 
From (1),  dX=  dP,  and, from 2a 
dPi  S  dPl  +  S  dPlk 
Pi  pl+si  Plk 
substitution  gives the final differential. 26  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1972 
The first bracketed  coefficient  gives the direct elasticity  of demand  in 
countryj for imports  of tradeable  goods from  country  i, given  a change  in 
the price i  charges.  The second set of coefficients,  Skj~,  -  -q), are the 
cross-price  elasticities  of demand  of country  j for exports  from  i of trade- 
able goods, given third-country  k changes  in price. For each country  j, 
an estimate  of the elasticity  of demand  for tradeable  goods, -,, an estimate 
of the elasticity  of substitution  by source  of supply,  ay,  and a trade  shares 
matrix  by supplier  of tradeables,  Sij, would  yield a complete  set of direct 
and  cross-price  elasticities  of demand  for tradeable  goods  from  each  source 
X1ij  with respect  to changes  in relative  prices  or exchange  rates.  Thus, q, 
and o-j  are the two key elasticities  determining  the influence  of price 
changes  on trade  flows. 
THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR A MODEL OF TRADE SHARES 
The Armington  model provides a theoretical  basis for export share 
models,  such  as that of Adams  and  his associates.  Armington  assumes  that 
products  are  distinguished  in utility  functions  by place  of production;  from 
this assumption,  the derivation  of basic share  equations  such as (3), with 
relative  prices  as the fundamental  arguments,  follows  directly.  To say this, 
however,  does not answer  Armington's  initial  question:  Why  would  buyers 
purchase  the same  good from  different  sellers  if their  prices  were  different? 
He offers  a tautological  answer:  Because  they distinguish  between  sources 
in their  utility  functions. 
Several  reasons  may explain  why purchasers  distinguish  among  sources 
of supply.  For example,  the distribution  function  (3) is consistent  with a 
monopolistic  competition  model of the market  for tradeable  goods with 
a market  demand  for X1 and individual  firm demand  curves  for Xii. In 
this case the supply adjustment  discussed  earlier  would depend on the 
marginal  revenue and cost functions of the monopolistic  competitors, 
rather  than arising  from a movement  along a competitively  determined 
supply  curve. 
Another  possibility  would be to recognize  risk as an element  in deter- 
mining shares,  given different  prices among suppliers.  Where changing 
suppliers  internationally  incurred  no fixed transactions  costs, and where 
deliveries  were  immediate,  it would make  sense, if prices  differed,  to buy 
only from the cheapest  source.  But if switching  sellers  is costly, and if it 
means  losing a place at the head of the queue,  paying  a higher  price  to a William H. Branson  27 
stable  supplier  (in terms  of variance  of price  and delivery  time)  may  prove 
cheaper.  If the various suppliers  were distributed  continuously  along a 
spectrum  of such  risks,  to buy from  several  of them,  balancing  a marginal 
reduction  in risk  against  a marginal  increase  in total cost, would  be worth- 
while.  This kind of basic  model  could also yield stable  share  relationships 
as functions  of relative  prices.  In that case the unmeasurable  risk factors 
are "suppressed,"  although  in fact the coefficients  would  be combinations 
of the relevant  variances.  Either  the monopolistic  competition  or the risk- 
and-return  approach,  in place of the simple assumption  that sources  of 
supply  enter the utility function,  seem to put the whole Armington  ap- 
proach  on a better  footing,  while  preserving  all of its usefulness. 
Application  of the Armington  Model 
The Armington  model yields an efficient  and theoretically  satisfactory 
way to obtain consistent  estimates  of the effects of the realignments  of 
exchange  rates on trade balances.  The changes  in trade balances  across 
countries  should  sum to zero, since a rest-of-the-world  sector  is included, 
and they should be systematically  related  to the underlying  structure  of 
trade. The model insures  consistency  while permitting  variation  of the 
assumptions  that go into the estimates. 
The illustrative  applications  of the model presented  in Armington's 
second  and third  papers,  and  this extension  to suggest  some  a priori "rea- 
sonable"  values  for expected  trade  changes,  simplify  world  trade  by divid- 
ing all goods into two separate  sub-components,  traded and nontraded 
goods. Such  a division  seems  to imply,  for example,  that if the elasticity  of 
substitution  among  sources  of tradeable  goods in the demand  function  of 
country  j is the same  value  of 0j for each  pair  of sources,  each  source  must 
be supplying  a similar  mix of tradeable  goods. Thus an important  step in 
empirical  implementation  of the model  would  be to disaggregate  by types 
of commodity  according  to standard  international  trade classifications.16 
16. Actually, Armington  switched  from a matrix of trade in manufactures,  used in 
"Geographic  Pattern,"  to trade  in all commodities  in "Adjustment  of Trade Balances," 
without explaining  the reasons  for the switch. He also reduced  his assumed  elasticity  of 
substitution  from 3 to 2 in the transition,  probably  due to the inclusion  of trade  in agri- 
cultural  goods. Below I use a matrix  of total trade, following  Armington's  lead but up- 
dating  to 1971,  and experiment  a bit with elasticities. 28  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Table 2.  Direction of External and Internal Trade, Fourteen  Major OECD 
Countries  and the Rest of the World, 1971 
Millions of U.S. dollars at annual rates, f.o.b. 
Buying 
United  Belgium- 
Selling country  States  Canada  Japan  Austria  Luxembourg  Denmark  France 
United States  114,022.8  10,365.7  4,054.7  100.6  1,077.7  254.6  1,380.2 
Canada  12,080.9  6,186.0  783.8  8.8  178.9  23.2  154.4 
Japan  7,445.3  852.2  15,366.4  38.9  213.5  64.7  184.9 
Austria  127.8  41.9  14.3  1,776.8  39.6  69.5  73.0 
Belgium-Luxembourg  834.0  57.8  75.0  74.0  1,458.4  108.6  2,498.6 
Denmark  285.2  36.0  32.4  56.5  48.7  1,467.8  92.2 
France  1,101.7  221.5  154.4  155.4  2,284.3  187.3  22,039.2 
Germany  3,752.9  412.4  511.4  1,804.8  3,300.1  824.9  4,803.5 
Italy  1,483.7  163.7  116.4  279.2  572.8  107.8  2.047,0 
Netherlands  562.7  86.0  75.6  122.2  1,845.4  193.4  1,442.9 
Notway  180.1  19.1  21.6  18.4  59.9  189.4  115.3 
Sweden  489.8  111.7  72.8  135.7  230.0  739.3  377.0 
Switzerland  495.1  76.2  164.5  328.6  127.8  105.0  505.7 
United Kingdom  2,644.9  852.6  381.1  258.7  826.8  566.9  958.7 
Rest of the world  10,697.8  866.4  11,164.2  457.6  918.6  806.0  5,018.0 
Source: Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and Development, Overall  Trade  by Countries,  Series A, Supple- 
ment (OECD, March 1972). Foreign sales of the fourteen countries and the rest of the world are fo.b.  export data 
using a standard adjustment  from c.i.f. to f.o.b. Internal trade figures-the  diagonal element of the table-were  cal- 
culated by setting the ratio of each country's internal trade to its total imports equal to the value Armington gives for 
But the focus here is the effects of exchange rate changes on total trade, 
eliminating any commodity index from the analysis, so the Tij matrix of 
trade among many countries is used. Again, indexes run across i sellers 
and j buyers, and I  =  J so that the trade matrix is square. 
The trade matrix for 1971 is shown in Table 2. The table is derived from 
export data, and the entries are in millions of U.S. dollars at annual rates, 
f.o.b. Note  that the diagonal elements of the matrix give an estimate of 
each country's internal trade in tradeable goods. The size of these entries 
reflects the fact that gross trade in inputs as well as final products is under 
consideration, so that the total trade of any country will greatly exceed its 
gross domestic product (GDP) of tradeable goods measured as final prod- 
uct or as value added. The internal trade entries were obtained by using 
Armington's data to derive ratios for each country of internal trade to total 
imports, averaged over the three years 1966-68, which were then applied 
to the corresponding country's total imports for 1971.17  The trade share 
matrix Sij, which gives the share of each country i of the market for trade- 
able goods of country j,  is given in Table 3. Each entry in this table is the 
ratio of the corresponding cell of Table 2 to its column total. 
17. See Armington, "Adjustment  of Trade Balances," Table 9,  pp. 518-19, and 
Appendix  A, pp. 512-14. William H. Branson  29 
country 
United  Rest of 
Germany  Italy  Netherlands  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Kingdom  the world 
2,832.0  1,314.0  1,785.4  184.9  469.9  626.8  2,374.0  17,196.1 
316.3  208.0  232.4  184.7  44.8  37.9  1,347.5  2,074.9 
629.5  181.4  355.1  215.2  117.7  205.8  555.4  12,360.6 
719.9  291.0  92.4  42.5  122.8  350.8  224.8  928.3 
3,069.7  538.1  2,332.6  102.8  206.9  260.5  443.0  1,699.2 
448.3  129.7  90.5  267.0  584.2  107.2  696.5  740.3 
4,381.4  2,237.2  1,164.1  100.7  251.5  967.9  933.8  6,378.4 
28,540.6  3,244.8  4,139.5  549.7  1,297.9  2,283.4  1,529.8  9,963.7 
3,440.5  10,864.9  694.2  84.0  181.2  712.1  585.0  4,655.2 
4,713.2  730.0  2,174.6  112.7  295.6  266.5  1,018.8  2,371.2 
397.2  57.8  75.7  893.0  436.4  28.2  481.0  484.7 
832.6  215.6  327.7  765.2  2,781.4  217.1  1,006.6  1,918.4 
875.4  508.4  150.8  81.5  189.7  3,672.8  419.2  1,735.6 
1,303.3  607.3  997.2  410.8  933.8  564.4  13,488.5  11,047.4 
7,299.8  4,518.6  1,539.5  681.5  1,396.8  237.2  10,534.3  73,405.8 
1966-68 annual averages.  (Paul S. Armington, "Adjustment  of Trade Balances: Some Experiments  with a Model of 
Trade Among Many Countries," International  Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, Vol. 17, November 1970, Table 9, pp. 
518-19, and Appendix A, pp. 512-14.) 
DIRECT  AND  CROSS-PRICE  ELASTICITIES 
Given the total trade matrix,  the direct and cross-price  elasticities  of 
demand  of each country  j for the tradeable  goods of each country  i, in 
response  to a change in price of one country  k, are (from equation  (4) 
above), 
(5)  di]  - -(1-  S  i)aj- ij-  i  =  -[oaj-  Si;(aj -7  - 
for the direct  elasticity  of demand  for the goods  of the country  whose  price 
changes, i =  k, and 
(6)  cij  =  S+J(cr  -  ) 
for the cross-price  elasticity  of demand  by country  j for the goods of all 
other  (non-k)  countries  given  a change  in price  in country  k. The direct  and 
cross-price  elasticities  are closely related,  since the two expressions  show 
that 
c  -  0dij=ap. 
Normally the elasticity  of substitution  ?j would exceed (in absolute 
value)  the elasticity  of demand  for tradeables  as a whole  -q  by a substantial 
amount.  If that is the case, equations  (5) and (6) make  clear that, as the 
share  Sij of any given  seller  in a market  rises,  the direct  price  elasticity  of 
demand  for his goods falls and the cross-price  elasticity  rises. If Sij ap- 30  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1972 
Table  3. Market  Shares  of External  and  Internal  Trade,  Fourteen  Major OECD 
Countries  and  the Rest of the World,  1971 
Percentage 
Buying 
United  Belgium- 
Selling country  States  Canada  Japan  Austria  Luxembourg  Denmark  France 
United States  73.0  50.9  12.3  1.8  8.2  4.5  3.3 
Canada  7.7  30.4  2.4  0.2  1.4  0.4  0.4 
Japan  4.8  4.2  46.6  0.7  1.6  1.1  0.4 
Austria  0.1  0.2  0.0  31.6  0.3  1.2  0.2 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.5  0.3  0.2  1.3  11.1  1.9  6.0 
Denmark  0.2  0.2  0.1  1.0  0.4  25.7  0.2 
France  0.7  1.1  0.5  2.8  17.3  3.3  52.9 
Germany  2.4  2.0  1.5  32.1  25.0  14.4  11.5 
Italy  0.9  0.8  0.3  5.0  4.3  1.9  4.9 
Netherlands  0.4  0.4  0.2  2.2  14.0  3.4  3.5 
Norway  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  3.3  0.3 
Sweden  0.3  0.5  0.2  2.4  1.7  12.9  0.9 
Switzerland  0.3  0.4  0.5  5.8  1.0  1.8  1.2 
United Kingdom  1.7  4.2  1.2  4.6  6.3  9.9  2.3 
Rest of the world  6.8  4.3  33.8  8.1  7.0  14.1  12.0 
Source: Table 2. 
proaches  unity, dij approaches  -q,,  the total market  demand  elasticity;  as 
it approaches  zero, dij approaches  aj, the substitution  elasticity.  If one 
seller  has only a small  share  of the market,  his price  cut attracts  trade  from 
other  sellers,  and he also gains  from  an expansion  of the market.  But if he 
already  has the entire  market,  his price  cut cannot  divert  trade  from  other 
sellers.  This again is a principal  feature  of a monopolistic  competition 
model. 
With  a trade  shares  matrix  Sij and an assumption  concerning  the values 
of q, and aj, the matrixes  of elasticities  giving  the change  in purchases  of 
any country  j  from any country  i, given a change in the price level or 
exchange  rate of any country,  can be generated.  One modification  that is 
useful  is to state  first  the direct  elasticity  in value  terms,  in order  to generate 
a trade  change  matrix  in value terms.  To do this requires  simply  adding 
.1.0  to the dij expression. 
The dij +  1 and cij  matrixes  for 1971  are  shown  in Tables  4 and 5 under 
Armington's  assumptions,  reported in  "Geographic  Pattern,"  that all 
74  =  1.0 and all aj =  3.0.18 The assumption  that -q,  is unity means  that a 
18. I have  no specific  evidence  that 3.0 is a correct  value  for oi. Armington  asserts  that 
values in this range  are consistent  with empirical  evidence,  and this value leads to trade 
elasticities  consistent with Magee's empirical  work, as shown in Table 10 below. See 
Armington,  "Geographic  Pattern  of Trade,"  p. 182.  Hendrik  S. Houthakker  also believes 
this is consistent  with the econometric  evidence,  as is evidenced  in his comment on this 
paper. William  H. Branson  31 
country 
United  Rest of 
Germany  Italy  Netherlands  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Kingdon  the world 
4.7  5.1  11.0  3.9  5.1  5.9  6.7  11.7 
0.5  0.8  1.4  3.9  0.5  0.4  3.8  1.4 
1.0  0.7  2.2  4.6  1.3  1.9  1.6  8.4 
1.2  1.1  0.6  0.9  1.3  3.3  0.6  0.6 
5.1  2.1  14.4  2.2  2.2  2.5  1.2  1.2 
0.7  0.5  0.6  5.7  6.3  1.0  1.9  0.5 
7.3  8.7  7.2  2.1  2.7  9.2  2.6  4.3 
47.6  12.6  25.6  11.8  13.9  21.7  4.3  6.8 
5.7  42.4  4.3  1.8  1.9  6.8  1.6  3.2 
7.9  2.8  13.5  2.4  3.2  2.5  2.9  1.6 
0.7  0.2  0.5  19.1  4.7  0.3  1.3  0.3 
1.4  0.8  2.0  16.4  29.9  2.1  2.8  1.3 
1.5  2.0  0.9  1.7  2.0  34.8  1.2  1.2 
2.2  2.4  6.2  8.8  10.0  5.4  37.8  7.5 
12.2  17.6  9.5  14.6  15.0  2.2  29.6  49.9 
given fraction of income is spent on tradeable  goods, and hence that 
changes  in prices  of other  goods do not affect  the demand  for tradeables. 
In cells with very low shares,  the direct  value elasticity  is near  2.0, while 
cells with  high shares  have  absolute  values  below 1.5. For example,  the di- 
rect  value  elasticity  of Austria  for Canadian  goods is 1.997,  while  that for 
German  goods, which take 32 percent  of the Austrian  market,  is 1.357. 
The cross-price  elasticities  simply  multiply  the shares  matrix  by 2.0, from 
equation  (6). 
COMPUTATION  OF  THE  TRADE  CHANGE  MATRIX 
The computation  of the change in the trade matrix  resulting  from a 
revaluation  by an individual  country,  assuming  infinite  supply  elasticities 
to start with, involves  multiplying  the elements  of that country's  row of 
the dij +  1 matrix  by the same elements  of the Tij matrix.  The product 
is the corresponding  row in the DTij trade change matrix. Then the 
elements  in that  country's  row  in the cij matrix  are  multiplied  by the corre- 
sponding  elements  in all the other  rows of Tij to fill out DT,j. 
Thus for a percentage  revaluation  dPk by country  k, the trade  change 
matrix  is given  by 
(dkj  +  1)(Tkj)(dPk), for row k; 
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Table 4.  Direct Value Elasticities of Demand dij +  1 for Fourteen  Major 
OECD Countries  and the Rest of the World, 1971 
Demander 
United  Belgium- 
Goods producer  States  Canada  Japan  Austria  Luxembourg  Denmark  France 
United States  -0.540  -0.982  -1.754  -1.964  -1.836  -1.911  -1.934 
Canada  -1.845  -1.392  -1.952  -1.997  -1.973  -1.992  -1.993 
Japan  -1.905  -1.916  -1.068  -1.986  -1.968  -1.977  -1.991 
Austria  -1.998  -1.996  -1.999  -1.367  -1.994  -1.976  -1.996 
Belgium-Luxembourg  -1.989  -1.994  -1.995  -1.974  -1.779  -1.962  -1.880 
Denmark  -1.996  -1.996  -1.998  -1.980  -1.993  -1.486  -1.996 
France  -1.986  -1.978  -1.990  -1.945  -1.653  -1.934  -0.943 
Germany  -1.952  -1.959  -1.969  -1.357  -1.499  -1.711  -1.770 
Italy  -1.981  -1.984  -1.993  -1.901  -1.913  -1.962  -1.902 
Netherlands  -1.993  -1.992  -1.995  -1.956  -1.720  -1.932  -1.931 
Norway  -1.998  -1.998  -1.999  -1.993  -1.991  -1.934  -1.994 
Sweden  -1.994  -1.989  -1.996  -1.952  -1.965  -1.741  -1.982 
Switzerland  -1.994  -1.993  -1.990  -1.883  -1.981  -1.963  -1.976 
United Kingdom  -1.966  -1.916  -1.977  -1.908  -1.875  -1.801  -1.954 
Rest of the world  -1.863  -1.915  -1.323  -1.837  -1.861  -1.718  -1.759 
Source: Elasticity formula described in the text, and Table 3, with elasticity of substitution a  =  3 and elasticity 
of demand 7 =  1 in each market. 
Table 5.  Cross-price  Elasticities of Demand cij for Fourteen  Major OECD 
Countries  and the Rest of the World, 1971 
Demander 
Country  changing  United  Belgium- 
its price  States  Canada  Japan  Austria  Luxembourg  Denmark  France 
United States  1.460  1.018  0.246  0.036  0.164  0.089  0.066 
Canada  0.155  0.608  0.048  0.003  0.027  0.008  0.007 
Japan  0.095  0.084  0.932  0.014  0.032  0.023  0.009 
Austria  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.633  0.006  0.024  0.004 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.011  0.006  0.005  0.026  0.221  0.038  0.120 
Denmark  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.020  0.007  0.514  0.004 
France  0.014  0.022  0.010  0.055  0.347  0.066  1.057 
Germany  0.048  0.041  0.031  0.643  0.501  0.289  0.230 
Italy  0.019  0.016  0.007  0.099  0.087  0.038  0.098 
Netherlands  0.007  0.008  0.005  0.044  0.280  0.068  0.069 
Norway  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.007  0.009  0.066  0.006 
Sweden  0.006  0.011  0.004  0.048  0.035  0.259  0.018 
Switzerland  0.006  0.007  0.010  0.117  0.019  0.037  0.024 
United Kingdom  0.034  0.084  0.023  0.092  0.125  0.199  0.046 
Rest of the world  0.137  0.085  0.677  0.163  0.139  0.282  0.241 
Source: Same as Table 4. 
For changes in many exchange rates, this procedure can be repeated to 
obtain a stack of DT,j  matrixes, one for each change, which can then be 
added vertically-summing  each ij across k matrixes-to  obtain the net 
effect. 
This  exercise has  been  performed with  the  vector  of  exchange rate 
changes shown in Table 6,  which are percentage changes in the dollar 
price of each currency from April 30 to December 31, 1971, and the trade William H. Branson  33 
Demander 
United  Rest of 
Germany  Italy  Netherlands  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Kingdom  the world 
-1.906  -1.898  -1.779  -1.921  -1.898  -1.881  -1.867  -1.766 
-1.989  -1.984  -1.971  -1.921  -1.990  -1.993  -1.924  -1.972 
-1.979  -1.986  -1.956  -1.908  -1.975  -1.961  -1.969  -1.832 
-1.976  -1.977  -1.989  -1.982  -1.974  -1.933  -1.987  -1.987 
-1.898  -1.958  -1.711.  -1.956  -1.956  -1.951  -1.975  -1.977 
-1.985  -1.990  -1.989  -1.886  -1.875  -1.980  -1.961  -1.990 
-1.854  -1.826  -1.856  -1.957  -1.946  -1.816  -1.948  -1.913 
-1.048  -1.747  -1.487  -1.765  -1.721  -1.567  -1.914  -1.864 
-1.885  -1.153  -1.914  -1.964  -1.961  -1.865  -1.967  -1.937 
-1.843  -1.943  -1.731  -1.952  -1.937  -1.949  -1.943  -1.968 
-1  .987  -1.995  -1.991  -1.618  -1.906  -1.995  -1.973  -1.993 
-1.972  -1.983  -1.959  -1.673  -1.403  -1.959  -1.944  -1.974 
-1.971  -1.960  -1.981  -1.965  -1.959  -1.303  -1.976  -1.976 
-1.957  -1.953  -1.877  -1.824  -1.799  -1.893  -1.243  -1.850 
-1.756  -1.648  -1.809  -1.709  -1.700  -1.955  -1.409  -1.001 
Demander 
United  Rest of 
Germany  Italy  Netherlands  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Kingdom  the world 
0.094  0.102  0.221  0.079  0.102  0.119  0.133  0.234 
0.011  0.016  0.029  0.079  0.010  0.007  0.076  0.028 
0.021  0.014  0.044  0.092  0.025  0.039  0.031  0.168 
0.024  0.023  0.011  0.018  0.026  0.067  0.013  0.013 
0.102  0.042  0.289  0.044  0.044  0.049  0.025  0.023. 
0.015  0.010  0.011  0.114  0.125  0.020  0.039  0.010 
0.146  0.174  0.144  0.043  0.054  0.184  0.052  0.087 
0.952  0.253  0.513  0.235  0.279  0.433  0.086  0.136 
0.115  0.847  0.086  0.036  0.039  0.135  0.033  0.063 
0.157  0.057  0.269  0.048  0.063  0.051  0.057  0.032 
0.013  0.005  0.009  0.382  0.094  0.005  0.027  0.007 
0.028  0.017  0.041  0.327  0.597  0.041  0.056  0.026 
0.029  0.040  0.019  0.035  0.041  0.697  0.024  0.024 
0.043  0.047  0.123  0.176  0.201  0.107  0.757  0.150 
0.244  0.352  0.191  0.291  0.300  0.045  0.591  0.999 
and elasticity matrixes shown in Tables 2 to 5. The result is the trade change 
matrix shown in Table 7. Use of the unadjusted vector of exchange rate 
changes to calculate Table 7 implicitly assumes infinite supply elasticities; 
the results of  applying a 20 percent supply elasticity adjustment to  the 
vector of rate changes are reported in Table 8. Below the matrix are given 
the arithmetic and percentage changes in exports and imports,  and the 
change in the trade balance for each country. Above the matrix are shown 34  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Table  6. Percentage  Changes  in Exchange  Rates  of Thirteen  Major 
OECD Countries  and  the Rest of the World,  April  30-December  31, 1971 
Percentage  change  in 
Country  terms  of U.S. dollarss 
Canada  0.79 
Japan  16.88 
Austria  11.59 
Belgium  11.57 
Denmark  7.45 
France  8.57 
Germany  13.58 
Italy  7.48 
Netherlands  11.57 
Norway  7.49 
Sweden  7.49 
Switzerland  13.88 
United Kingdom  8.57 
Rest of the world  3.76 
Sources: Data for all countries except as noted are from International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial  News Survey, Vol. 23 (December 22-30,  1971), p. 421; Switzerland  is from Economic  Report of the 
President, January 1972, p. 143; Canada is from ibid. and IMF, International  Financial Statistics, various 
issues; rest of the world is from ibid. and International  Financial News Survey, cited above. 
a.  All exchange rates (r) are stated in $1 units of foreign currency. The percentage change formula is 
([r(12/31)/r(4/30)]  -  1) X 100. 
the vector  of exchange  rate  changes.  Since  these  are  all stated  relative  to the 
dollar,  the U.S. entry  in the price  change  vector  is zero, and  the U.S. rows 
in the elasticity  matrix  play no direct  role in the calculation  of the trade 
change  matrix.19 
Table  7 shows that under  the assumption  of infinite  supply  elasticities, 
the trade  balances  of the United States  and the rest of the world  (ROW), 
mainly  less developed  countries,  increase  substantially.  The United States 
gains $10.0  billion  (annual  rates)  while  the ROW  gains $7.6  billion,  based 
on the 1971 levels of trade.  As would be expected,  Japan  and Germany 
show  the  biggest  downward  shifts;  Japan's  surplus  is projected,  under  these 
assumptions,  to fall by about $7.8 billion, and Germany's  by $6.5 billion. 
Canada,  which  stayed  with the U.S. dollar,  also gains  substantially.20 
19. The changes  shown in Table 7 come from a comparative-static  exercise  based on 
the assumed  elasticities.  While  the resulting  direct  value elasticities  and cross-price  elas- 
ticities are not very different  in general  magnitude  from those obtained empirically  by 
Magee, it should be emphasized  that they come from arbitrary  assumptions,  not em- 
pirical  estimation. 
20. While  the U.S. dollar  price  of the Canadian  dollar  was virtually  unchanged  during 
1971,  it rose by 7.31 percent  from December  31, 1969,  to April 30, 1971.  Under  the same William H. Branson  35 
ADJUSTMENTS  FOR ELASTICITIES OF SUPPLY  AND  OF SUBSTITUTION 
To allow for effects  of the revaluations  on supply  prices,  the vector of 
the exchange  rate  change  has been reduced  by a factor  of 0.2; that is, the 
original  exchange  rate  change  vector  was  multiplied  by 0.8 before  applying 
it to the elasticity  and trade  matrixes.  As noted  above,  this kind of adjust- 
ment  would  be consistent,  analytically,  with  supply  elasticities  of 9.0, which 
seem  reasonable  by Magee's  estimates. 
The resulting trade change matrix, with o- =  3.0, qj =  1.0, and the re- 
duced  exchange  rate  change  vector,  is shown  in Table  8. The entries  are all 
smaller  than  those  in Table  7 by 20 percent.  The supply  adjustment  reduces 
the swing in the U.S. trade balance  from $10.0 billion with universally 
infinite  supply  elasticities  to $8.0  billion  with supply  elasticities  of around 
9.0-10.0. Of the $8.0 billion  swing,  about $3.5 billion  comes  from  reduced 
import payments,  and $4.4 billion from increased  export receipts.  With 
the supply  adjustment,  Japan's  surplus  is projected  to fall by $6.2 billion, 
and Germany's  by $5.2 billion.  Canada's  surplus  rises  by about $1 billion, 
and the United  Kingdom's  falls  by $1.1  billion.  Belgium-Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands,  and Switzerland  also sustain  substantial  reductions  in their 
trade  surpluses. 
The other  area  with a large  increase  in its trade  surplus  is ROW,  with  a 
gain of $6.0 billion, probably  concentrated  in the group  that stayed  with 
the dollar (another  followed  the European  changes).  The $6.0 billion is 
probably  an overstatement,  since the elasticity  of substitution  between 
exports of less developed  countries  and those of advanced  countries  is 
likely  to be much  smaller  than that among  advanced  countries. 
Finally,  the row and column  sums  for exports  and imports  show a drop 
of about $2.7 billion, which is also the sum of the diagonal  elements  of 
Table  8. The devaluations  in the United  States  and ROW  promote  growth 
in;their  internal  trade of $3.5 billion and $2.9 billion, respectively,  more 
than offsetting  the drops  in most other  countries. 
Next, the effect  of reducing  the elasticity  of substitution  from  3.0 to 2.5, 
retaining  the 0.2 supply  adjustment,  is reported  in Table  9. As is apparent 
both analytically  and from the table, this reduction  simply scales down 
all the effects of revaluation.  The swing in the U.S. surplus  falls from 
assumptions  as those of Table 7, this will result  in an ultimate  drop of $3.1 billion  in the 
Canadian  trade  surplus,  and a $1.8 billion  rise in the U.S. surplus. Table 7.  Changes  in Trade Using Elasticity of Substitution  a  =  3 and 
Zero Supply Adjustment,  Fourteen  Major OECD Countries  and the 
Rest of the World, 1971 
Amounts of change in trade in millions of U.S. dollars at annual rates, f.o.b. 
Buying country and 
United  Belgium- 
States  Canada  Japan  Austria  Luxembourg Denmark  France 
Selling country  0.0  0.0079  0.1688  0.1159  0.1157  0.0745  0.0857 
United States  4,398.4  438.2  785.6  22.0  205.9  41.3  236.7 
Canada  275.1  163.8  139.5  1.8  31.4  3.4  24.0 
Japan  -2,226.3  -251.7  -2,210.4  -4.6  -31.3  -11.4  -30.7 
Austria  -24.7  -7.9  -0.5  -22.5  -1.6  -4.8  -4.4 
Belgium-Luxembourg  -160.8  -10.9  -2.8  -0.9  -58.8  -7.5  -149.6 
Denmark  -31.5  -3.8  1.4  4.0  2.0  19.2  2.1 
France  -146.3  -28.6  3.5  7.4  44.9  -1.7  2.5 
Germany  -874.5  -94.6  -39.8  -94.6  -265.7  -90.3  -480.8 
Italy  -164.7  -17.6  5.1  19.4  23.8  1.3  44.9 
Netherlands  -108.5  -16.3  -2.8  -1.5  -74.4  -13.4  -86.4 
Norway  -20.0  -2.1  0.9  1.3  2.5  2.3  2.5 
Sweden  -54.5  -12.0  3.2  9.4  9.5  9.1  8.2 
Switzerland  -118.3  -17.9  -13.8  -19.2  -11.1  -12.1  -53.6 
United Kingdom  -351.3  -110.1  8.5  12.4  16.3  -5.3  0.1 
Rest of the world  -391.8  -28.5  1,323.5  65.9  106.4  70.0  483.3 
Change in total exports 
Dollar amount  5,552.9  1,030.6  -5,559.6  -224.5  -799.2  -6.0  -270.6 
Percent  12.62  5.83  -23.74  -7.15  -6.50  -0.17  -1.32 
Change in total imports 
Dollar amount  -4,398.2  -163.9  2,211.5  22.7  58.6  -19.2  -3.7 
Percent  -10.43  -1.16  12.55  0.59  0.50  -0.45  -0.02 
Change in trade balance  9,951.2  1,194.4  -7,771.1  -247.2  -857.8  13.3  -266.9 
Sources: Derived from Tables 2, 4, 5, and 6. Figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
Table 8.  Changes in Trade Using Elasticity of Substitution  o  =  3 and 0.2 Supply 
Adjustment,  Fourteen  Major OECD Countries  and the Rest of the World, 1971 
Amounts of change in trade in millions of U.S. dollars at annual rates, fo.b. 
Buying country  and 
United  Belgium- 
States  Canada  Japan  Austria  Luxembourg  Denmark  France 
Selling counttry  0.0  0.0063  0.1350  0.0927  0.0926  0.0596  0.0686 
United States  3,518.7  350.6  628.5  17.6  164.7  33.0  189.4 
Canada  220.1  131.0  111.6  1.4  25.1  2.7  19.2 
Japan  -1,781.1  -201.4  -1,768.3  -3.7  -25.0  -9.1  -24.6 
Austria  -19.8  -6.3  -0.4  -18.0  -1.3  -3.9  -3.5 
Belgium-Luxembourg  -128.7  -8.8  -2.3  -0.7  -47.0  -6.0  -119.7 
Denmark  -25.2  -3.1  1.2  3.2  1.6  15.3  1.7 
France  -117.1  -22.9  2.8  5.9  36.0  -1.4  2.0 
Germany  -699.6  -75.7  -31.9  -75.7  -212.6  -72.3  -384.6 
Italy  -131.8  -14.1  4.1  15.5  19.0  1.1  35.9 
Netherlands  -86.8  -13.0  -2.3  -1.2  -59.5  -10.7  -69.1 
Norway  -16.0  -1.6  0.8  1.0  2.0  1.9  2.0 
Sweden  -43.6  -9.6  2.6  7.5  7.6  7.3  6.5 
Switzerland  -94.7  -14.3  -11.0  -15.4  -8.8  -9.7  -42.9 
United Kingdom  -281.0  -88.1  6.8  9.9  13.0  -4.2  0.1 
Rest of the world  -313.4  -22.8  1,058.8  52.7  85.2  56.0  386.6 
Change in total exports 
Dollar amount  4,442.4  824.4  -4,447.7  -179.6  -639.4  -4.8  -216.5 
Percent  10.09  4.66  -18.99  -5.72  -5.20  -0.13  -1.06 
Change in total imports 
Dollar amount  -3,518.6  -131.1  1,769.2  18.2  46.9  -15.4  -3.0 
Percent  -8.34  -0.93  10.04  0.47  0.40  -0.36  -0.02 
Change  in trade balance  7,960.9  955.5  -6,216.9  -197.8  -686.3  10.6  -213.5 
Sources: Tables 2, 4, and 5, and the exchange rate change vectors in Table 6 reduced by 20 percent. Figures are 
rounded and may not add to totals. price change 
United  Rest of 
Germany  Italy  Netherlands  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Kingdom  the world 
0.1358  0.0748  0.1157  0.0749  0.0749  0.1388  0.0857  0.0376 
589.0  202.9  333.6  29.5  75.4  139.9  320.3  2,132.5 
60.8  28.8  39.8  26.6  6.5  7.9  160.5  224.5 
-81.6  -33.2  -53.5  -38.3  -20.8  -23.5  -112.5  -2,640.1 
-17.1  -22.5  -4.2  -3.1  -8.8  -3.0  -21.8  -100.1 
-71.9  -41.4  -103.9  -7.4  -14.7  -2.1  -42.7  -182.5 
26.4  0.7  3.4  2.9  6.7  8.0  -9.8  -18.5 
160.3  -38.0  18.0  -1.2  -2.7  50.2  -34.0  -302.3 
-1,815.4  -380.3  -350.9  -61.5  -144.2  -110.4  -209.1  -1,470.5 
200.9  52.1  25.9  0.8  2.0  52.5  -8.6  -119.1 
-110.3  -56.2  -96.9  -8.1  -21.0  -2.2  -98.3  -254.6 
23.1  0.3  2.8  8.9  4.7  2.1  -7.1  -12.5 
48.4  1.0  12.1  7.6  29.8  15.9  -15.0  -49.5 
-60.9  -62.6  -13.7  -9.6  -22.2  -199.6  -59.8  -266.6 
47.7  -10.3  15.4  -4.8  -10.2  29.3  -491.8  -523.5 
969.4  357.9  171.9  57.6  119.2  35.1  629.3  3,582.9 
-4,667.2  66.6  -854.0  0.7  -6.5  -741.6  -885.9  3,969.1 
-12.15  0.44  -6.17  0.03  -0.09  -12.87  -3.96  7.07 
1,784.2  -53.2  96.6  -8.9  -30.0  199.7  491.5  -3,582.8 
5.71  -0.36  0.69  -0.23  -0.46  2.91  2.22  -4.87 
-6,451.4  119.7  -950.6  9.6  23.6  -941.2  -1,377.4  7,551.9 
adjusted  price change 
United  Rest of 
Germaniy  Italy  Netherlands  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Kingdom  the world 
0.1086  0.0598  0.0926  0.0599  0.0599  0.1110  0.0686  0.0301 
471.2  162.3  266.9  23.6  60.3  111.9  256.3  1,706.0 
48.6  23.1  31.8  21.3  5.2  6.3  128.4  179.6 
-65.3  -26.6  -42.8  -30.6  -16.7  -18.8  -90.0  -2,112.1 
-13.7  -18.0  -3.3  -2.4  -7.0  -2.4  -17.4  -80.1 
-57.5  -33.1  -83.1  -5.9  -11.7  -1.7  -34.2  -146.0 
21.2  0.6  2.7  2.3  5.4  6.4  -7.8  -14.8 
128.3  -30.4  14.4  -0.9  -2.2  40.2  -27.2  -241.8 
-1,452.3  -304.2  -280.7  -49.2  -115.3  -88.3  -167.2  -1,176.4 
160.7  41.7  20.7  0.7  1.6  42.0  -6.9  -95.3 
-88.3  -45.0  -77.5  -6.5  -16.8  -1.7  -78.6  -203.7 
18.5  0.2  2.2  7.1  3.7  1.7  -5.7  -10.0 
38.8  0.8  9.7  6.1  23.8  12.8  -12.0  -39.6 
-48.7  -50.1  -11.0  -7.7  -17.8  -159.7  -47.8  -213.3 
38.2  -8.3  12.3  -3.8  -8.1  23.4  -393.4  -418.8 
775.5  286.3  137.5  46.1  95.3  28.1  503.4  2,866.3 
-3,733.8  53.2  -683.2  0.6  -5.2  -593.2  -708.7  3,175.3 
-9.72  0.35  -4.94  0.02  -0.07  -10.29  -3.17  5.66 
1,427.4  -42.5  77.3  -7.1  -24.0  159.7  393.2  -2,866.2 
4.57  -0.29  0.55  -0.19  -0.37  2.33  1.78  -3.90 
-5,161.1  95.8  -760.5  7.7  18.9  -753.0  -1,101.9  6,041.5 38  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Table 9.  Changes in Trade Using Elasticity of Substitution  a =  2.5 and 0.2 
Supply Adjustment,  Fourteen  Major OECD Countries  and the 
Rest of the World, 1971 
Amounts of change in trade in millions of U.S. dollars at annual rates, f.o.b. 
Buying country and 
United  Belgium- 
States  Canada  Japan  Austria  Luxembourg  Denmark  France 
Selling country  0.0  0.0063  0.1350  0.0927  0.0926  0.0596  0.0686 
United States  2,639.0  262.9  471.4  13.2  123.6  24.8  142.0 
Canada  165.1  98.3  83.7  1.1  18.8  2.0  14.4 
Japan  -1,335.8  -151.0  -1,326.3  -2.8  -18.8  -6.8  -18.4 
Austria  -14.8  -4.8  -0.3  -13.5  -1.0  -2.9  -2.6 
Belgium-Luxembourg  -96.5  -6.6  -1.7  -0.5  -35.3  -4.5  -89.8 
Denmark  -18.9  -2.3  0.9  2.4  1.2  11.5  1.2 
France  -87.8  -17.2  2.1  4.5  27.0  -1.0  1.5 
Germany  -524.7  -56.8  -23.9  -56.8  -159.4  -54.2  -288.5 
Italy  -98.8  -10.5  3.1  11.7  14.3  0.8  26.9 
Netherlands  -65.1  -9.8  -1.7  -0.9  -44.6  -8.0  -51.8 
Norway  -12.0  -1.2  0.6  0.8  1.5  1.4  1.5 
Sweden  -32.7  -7.2  1.9  5.6  5.7  5.4  4.9 
Switzerland  -71.0  -10.8  -8.3  -11.5  -6.6  -7.3  -32.2 
United Kingdom  -210.8  -66.1  5.1  7.4  9.8  -3.2  0.1 
Rest of the world  -235.1  -17.1  794.1  39.5  63.9  42.0  290.0 
Change in total exports 
Dollar amount  3, 331.8  618.3  -3,  335.8  -134.7  -479.5  -3.6  -162.4 
Percent  7.57  3.50  -14.24  -4.29  -3.90  -0.10  -0.79 
Change in total imports 
Dollar amount  -2,638.9  -98.3  1,326.9  13.6  35.2  -11.5  -2.2 
Percent  -6.26  -0.69  7.53  0.35  0.30  -0.27  -0.01 
Change in trade balance  5,970.7  716.7  -4,662.7  -148.3  -514.7  8.0  -160.2 
Sources: Table 2, elasticity matrixes analogous to Tables 4 and 5, and the exchange rate change vectors in Table 
6 reduced by 20 percent. Figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
$8.0 billion to $6.0 billion, while the changes for Japan and Germany fall 
from  $6.2 billion to  $4.7 billion,  and from $5.2 billion to  $3.9 billion, 
respectively. 
The choice  of  values for oj depends on  one's view of  plausible elas- 
ticities; while a typical value of dij +  1 with oj at 3.0 was about  1.98, 
it falls to about 1.48 with oj at 2.5. Magee's empirical elasticities, shown 
in the next section, are typically in that range, averaging out at 1.74. 
In evaluating these a priori estimates, the reader should remember that 
the object is to obtain a set of numbers that seem "reasonable," and, as 
important, that are consistent across countries. The sum of the trade bal- 
ance effects should be zero, and they should bear some relation to  the 
initial structure of trade, the base trade matrix. The Armington model per- 
mits enforcement of this consistency in an efficient and theoretically ac- 
ceptable way. 
Tables 7 and 9 seem to me to bound the plausible range of effects the 
1971 realignments will have on trade balances. Although they appear a bit William  H. Branson  39 
adjusted  price change 
United  Rest of 
Germany  Italy  Netherlands  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Kingdom  the world 
0.1086  0.0598  0.0926  0.0599  0.0599  0.1110  0.0686  0.0301 
353.4  121.7  200.1  17.7  45.3  84.0  192.2  1,279.5 
36.5  17.3  23.9  15.9  3.9  4.7  96.3  134.7 
-49.0  -19.9  -32.1  -23.0  -12.5  -14.1  -67.5  -1,584.1 
-10.3  -13.5  -2.5  -1.8  -5.3  -1.8  -13.1  -60.0 
-43.1  -24.9  -62.4  -4.4  -8.8  -1.3  -25.6  -109.5 
15.9  0.4  2.1  1.7  4.0  4.8  -5.9  -11.1 
96.2  -22.8  10.8  -0.7  -1.6  30.1  -20.4  -181.4 
-1,089.3  -228.2  -210.5  -36.9  -86.5  -66.2  -125.4  -882.3 
120.5  31.3  15.5  0.5  1.2  31.5  -5.1  -71.5 
-66.2  -33.7  -58.1  -4.8  -12.6  -1.3  -59.0  -152.8 
13.9  0.2  1.7  5.3  2.8  1.2  -4.3  -7.5 
29.1  0.6  7.3  4.6  17.9  9.6  -9.0  -29.7 
-36.6  -37.6  -8.2  -5.8  -13.3  -119.7  -35.9  -159.9 
28.6  -6.2  9.2  -2.9  -6.1  17.6  -295.1  -314.1 
581.6  214.7  103.1  34.6  71.5  21.1  377.6  2,149.7 
-2,800.3  39.9  -512.4  0.4  -3.9  -444.9  -531.5  2,381.5 
-7.29  0.26  -3.70  0.02  -0.05  -7.72  -2.38  4.24 
1,070.5  -31.9  58.0  -5.3  -18.0  119.8  294.9  -2,149.7 
3.42  -0.22  0.41  -0.14  -0.28  1.74  1.33  -2.92 
-3,870.9  71.8  -570.4  5.8  14.2  -564.7  -826.4  4,531.1 
high,  I would  use as a central  estimate  the Table  8 numbers,  which  include 
the 20 percent  supply  adjustment.  The tables  establish  a plausible  range  of 
$6 billion to $10 billion  for the eventual  swing  in the U.S. trade  balance 
due to the realignments  alone, with a central estimate of perhaps $7 billion 
to $8 billion.  This and the associated  numbers  from the last two rows of 
Table 8 for the other thirteen  countries  and ROW are estimates  of the 
"exogenous"  (from the macroeconomic  point of view) impacts  of the re- 
alignments  that  should  be fed into macro  models  to obtain  estimates  of the 
effects  on real income, and to estimate  the feedbacks  of these domestic 
effects  onto the trade  balances  that reduce  the size of the initial  influences. 
Empirical Estimates for U.S. Bilateral Trade 
The empirical  model  developed  by Stephen  P. Magee  provides  estimates 
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exchange rate changes.21 Magee's model uses the basic framework dis- 
cussed in the first section of  this paper to  estimate equations for U.S. 
bilateral trade with the fourteen countries of Table 2 except Austria, plus 
Australia, South Africa, and the ROW.22 For each pair of countries, the 
United  States and country i,  Magee specifies demand for imports as  a 
function of domestic income, a demand pressure variable such as unem- 
ployment, import prices, the domestic wholesale price index, and average 
prices of competing suppliers, for example, non-i sellers in the U.S. market. 
All of the prices in the import demand equation are denominated in the 
importer's currency. Export supply is specified as an increasing function 
of export prices, denominated in the exporter's  currency.  Then an exchange 
rate identity brings supply and demand together for each trade flow. An 
exchange rate change shifts the relevant curve, as Figure 1 depicts.23 
The model was estimated on annual data for the period 1951-69; for the 
estimates presented in Table 11 a base trade matrix for  1971 was used. 
EMPIRICAL ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
The Magee model, estimated in log-linear form, yields the direct value 
elasticity and cross-price elasticity estimates shown in Table 10. The direct 
value elasticities are the coefficients of the import and export price terms 
in his equations, reduced by one in absolute value to convert them to value 
elasticities. As long as the price elasticities exceed unity in absolute value, 
the value elasticities will also be negative; in three cases Magee's direct 
value elasticities are positive, indicating inelastic demand. 
The direct value elasticities from the U.S. row in Table 4 are comparable 
with Magee's estimates of direct value elasticities for exports, while the 
21. The basic references  are "A Theoretical  and Empirical  Examination  of Supply 
and Demand  Relationships  in U.S. International  Trade,"  and "United  States  Trade  and 
the New Economic Policy," both cited earlier.  An early  version of the model was pub- 
lished in H. S. Houthakker  and Stephen P. Magee, "Income and Price Elasticities  in 
World  Trade,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 51 (May 1969), pp. 111-25. In 
addition,  "The Effect  on the United States  Trade  Balance  of Currency  Revaluations  by 
the EEC and Japan,"  Studies  in International  Business  and Economics  2 (University  of 
California,  Berkeley,  Institute of International  Studies, March 1971; processed),  pro-9 
vides some preliminary  estimates  of the type shown below. 
22. In the comparisons  below  in Table 11,  Austria,  Australia,  and South  Africa  are all 
included  in the ROW totals for both the Armington  and Magee models. 
23. See "A Theoretical  and Empirical  Examination,"  Introduction  and Part II, pp. 
1-8, and "United States Trade,"  pp. 3-5, for the theoretical  structure  of the model. I  * 
.~~~~~c 
00  .z)  C0  c)  C)  N  C)  C  OOO  -  .-t 
H  mmmtQO 
O, 
.  U =  r  0  o 
I  I~~~~~~~~~~~E  c 
H~~~~~~0  cn  c-  un cn c  cn  C  r. 
P  o 
o 
m  m  n 
0  u 
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  i:  0_  C) 
0  > 
o  0  . 
i..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 
Q~~~~~4  tn  *_ C)  0  00  0  m  m  0  9  0  >D  Q  D ( 
.*  blo  o  CD  r-  0w  CD  o  ??  c  O  0  ? 
0  X0r)  aQI-I~e  -  en  - 
0  Q  Co*A-' 
X  t  oo  xD  O  m  b  oo  m  ,C  0  0  C )  .  ?  en  E  ^  A 
X Q  m  m  O  O  m  mq  e  C  romo  )  00  z 
rA  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cd 
U;  0  E 
mo  ?0  t  ?  N  ^  ?  t  NIo0o  ?  z  u  "I 
o  IlIllIllIll~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~to  Cdo 
.E  m~~~~~~~~  E OfO= 
X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C  -  w  ::  S 
0  t 
C0  w 
et  X  .~~C"  o  o 'o  ~'  Ch  W0  rn  oo  czc  z  o  )90  m-4  g  to; 
~~~~~  0  .~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
o  *~  4  ?Xooooo  I  I  Io  I-  I  I  i  i-  0  o  c  4 
*$Z  :  >X  ob  oo  o  0  tn  00  oN CN  cN  ON  ',  .=  >  00  o  ow  o  ooN  0o  o  oE ;  ; 
O 
o  _  o  oOo  0- 
Q  ci 
2  ?  , 
.2  > 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~  Y~~~~~~C 
- 
.0  C)  '  en  C)  < 
r@S  ;4  ?  ~~CIA>  00  cz  ct  r-  00  N  00  00 00  m  -  ..  U 
X  x  ~~~I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  uo  i  .  3  c  E 
2  >  s-g ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  Z' 
q,  6n  O;  4  cl  a  0 
hi  0  ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  0icL' 
0  E~~~~~~oo  o  - 
E  |  ?t |  ?  E r  |  ?  z  ac  4  < 
0  W  rY  Q  Q  re(Q  :U  ?3  R  E j  ,n  > b 
~~.9  ~~~~  ~  ~  E.2-~~~~G  '~z  ~~~~~~  ?  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c 
L).~~~*-  in  0~~~~~0  'O  ~~~~~  ~~~~~  ~  ~  ~  ~ 42  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1972 
for the distribution  function  is legitimate.  It would also show whether  a 
true q, exists for "traded-goods-as-a-whole,"  as opposed  to a different  q 
for each source of supply, testing the independence  assumption  on the 
original utility function.  These are problems  for further  exploration  in 
empirically  implementing  the Armington  model. 
ADJUSTMENTS  FOR SUPPLY  ELASTICITIES 
The  supply  adjustment  made  on Table  7 estimates  and  reported  in Table 
8 was based on Magee's  estimate  of U.S. total import  supply  elasticity  of 
about 8.5. It reduced  the swing on the U.S. trade  balance  by 20 percent. 
In making  his  supply  adjustment,  however,  Magee  uses  a different  supply 
elasticity  for each country.  His are lower  than the 8.5-10.0 range,  with an 
implicit overall elasticity  of supply of imports  to the United States of 
5.6.25 
Table  1 demonstrates  that,  with  an elasticity  of supply  of 5.6 and  demand 
elasticities  in the range  of 2.0-3.0, the supply  adjustment  would  be about 
35 percent,  as opposed  to the 20 percent  used  above; 35 percent  is also the 
average  adjustment  that Magee  uses in his empirical  estimates,  shown  in 
Table 11. 
I tend to hold to the earlier  estimate  for U.S. import  supply  elasticity, 
which  was statistically  significant.  In addition,  with relatively  slack  condi- 
tions prevailing  in the United States, Europe, and Japan in  1971-72, 
export  price  reactions  should  be smaller  than  they  are  in the average  condi- 
tions that dominate  an elasticity  estimated  over a twenty-year  sample. 
RESULTS FOR U.S.  BILATERAL TRADE  BALANCES 
The effects  of the exchange  rate realignment  in the a priori  model of 
Table  8 and  in the Magee  model  are  shown  in Table  11.  The a priori  entries 
show the U.S. row less the U.S. column of Table 8-changes  in U.S. 
25. For structural  reasons,  Magee  argues  that the total export  supply  elasticity  will be 
lower  the larger  the fraction  of total production  of exportables  sold abroad.  Thus Magee 
relates  export  supply  elasticity  to the ratio of GNP to exports.  Since  the U.S. supply  elas- 
ticity is about one-half the U.S. ratio of GNP to exports-10  z  1/2(1000/40)-Magee 
assumes that the supply elasticities  of all countries  can be approximated  by half the 
ratio of GNP to exports.  See "United States  Trade,"  Table 1, column 3, for these esti- 
mates.  They are  carried  over,  along with the reasoning  behind  them, from "Effect  on the 
U.S. Trade  Balance,"  pp. 5-6 and Table  2. Magee  provided  the 5.6 estimate  based  on the 
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U.S. column  of Table  4 provides  direct  value  elasticities  for imports.  For 
comparison  with Magee's  results,  these  are also shown  in Table 10, which 
makes  apparent  that  the empirical  estimates  are  much  more  scattered  than 
are  the a priori  theoretical  ones. This simply  reflects  the substantial  varia- 
tion among countries  of the actual elasticities  of substitution  aj, so that 
the assumption  that  all oj = 3.0 gives  a false  appearance  of regularity  to the 
elasticity  matrix  of Table  4. 
Some  notable  discrepancies  between  the two estimates  of elasticities  that 
will be important  in the appraisal  of the exchange  realignment  appear  for 
Canadian  exports,  Japanese  imports,  German  exports,  and U.K. exports. 
There  are other discrepancies,  but they generally  relate  to components- 
Swedish  exports,  for example-that are  not significant  in total U.S. trade. 
Magee's  cross-price  elasticities  are  the coefficients  on the weighted  aver- 
age of third-country  competitive  suppliers  in each  of his bilateral  log-linear 
regressions.  Thus  they  are  average  elasticities,  not directly  comparable  with 
the cij entries  of Table  5, which  are individual  elasticities.  However,  num- 
bers comparable  with Magee's  can be obtained  on the export side by 
summing  the Table 5 columns  omitting  the U.S. entry and the diagonal 
own-price  entry.  This yields the change  in U.S. exports  to each country, 
assuming  a uniform  price  change  in all other  countries.  Similarly,  on the 
import side, the U.S. column of Table 5 can be successively  summed, 
leaving out the U.S. entry and one other country  each time. This gives 
the change  in U.S. imports  from  the omitted  country,  assuming  all other 
prices  change. 
The results  of this operation  are shown  in the cross-price  elasticities  of 
Table  10. Since  all the Table  5 entries  are  positive,  so are  those  in Table  10, 
because  the original  assumption  that  oj >  -q,  means  that  all tradeable  goods 
are substitutes.  In Magee's  results,  the negative  cross-price  elasticities  for 
U.S. imports  from Denmark  and Germany  indicate  complementarity  be- 
tween  their  exports  and those of all other  suppliers  to the United States.24 
If empirical  estimates  of individual  cij coefficients  were available,  equa- 
tions (5) and (6) above would permit  solution for the implicit  oaj  and r; 
values,  given  dij, cij, and Sij. Thus  each set of bilateral  estimates  for these 
three  variables  would imply a value for o-j  and rn,  testing  the assumption 
that o-j  is the same for each pair of suppliers-that is, that the CES form 
24. While  there  is no theoretical  reason  to exclude  complementarity,  Magee  is dubious 
about these empirical  results,  and is reexamining  these cases. 0 
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bilateral trade balances. The first column of the empirical entries shows 
the initial effects on the trade balance with infinite supply elasticities, as 
Table 7 does. The next column gives the supply adjustments for individual 
countries, which vary greatly in percentage terms; the third and fourth 
columns, the effects on U.S.  bilateral exports and imports; and the fifth 
column the effect on the trade balances, to be compared with the a priori 
estimates from Table 8.26 
In addition to the supply adjustment, Magee's model provides adjust- 
ments for the direct effects on internal prices and real income due to higher 
import prices. These adjustments, which are small, take another $1 billion 
off his estimate shown in Table 11, bringing the final total down to  $7.1 
billion. I have not included these in Table 11, since no comparable adjust- 
ments were made in Table 8. But they suggest that the a priori estimates 
may be about $1 billion high. 
It seems clear from Table  11 that the a priori estimates and Magee's 
empirical results are roughly similar in composition  and quite close  in 
total. Considering the statistical significance of all the numbers involved, 
even $2 billion to  $3 billion would not represent a significant difference 
between estimates of the swing in the U.S. trade balance. 
Four differences  between Table 8 and the Magee results stand out, how- 
ever. These are in the values for Canada, Japan, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. In the case of Canada, the difference can be traced to those in 
estimates of the direct value elasticity of demand for Canadian imports 
from the United  States. The large U.S.  share of  the Canadian market 
suggests a low elasticity, but Magee's estimate is the largest of all U.S. 
export elasticities. Here I prefer the a priori model and the small effect 
on the United States-Canada balance. 
For the United Kingdom and Germany, the situation is just the opposite. 
Magee finds a much lower elasticity of both U.K. and German demand for 
U.S. exports than the a priori model suggests. I can see no reason for his 
conclusion. To the contrary, these are two of the more advanced manu- 
facturing countries on the list, so  they should have relatively high sub- 
stitutability of  home  goods  for U.S.  products. Here again the a  priori 
model seems preferable. 
In the case of Japan, the difference arises from the small supply adjust- 
ment relative to the average 35 percent in the Magee estimates. For Japan 
26. These estimates  were provided  by Stephen  P. Magee,  along with a number  of al- 
ternative  runs of his model, in response  to my request  for help in preparing  this paper.  I 
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his adjustment  is only 13 percent;  if it were  raised  to 35 percent,  the net 
effect  on the United States-Japan  trade  balance  would  fall to $2.2 billion, 
just a bit less than the a priori  estimate. 
The result of these comparisons  would be to reduce  Magee's  estimate 
for Japan  by $0.6 billion, reflecting  a larger  supply  adjustment,  to cut the 
estimate  for Canada  by $0.5  billion,  and  to increase  those  for Germany  and 
the United Kingdom  by $0.3 billion  each.  This would reduce  the total by 
$0.5  billion,  and  shift  the distribution  away  from  Japan  and Canada  to the 
United Kingdom and Germany.  Thus, in total the empirical  estimates 
from  the Magee  model and the a priori  estimates  match  fairly  well. 
Empirical  Estimates  for Total  Trade  Balances 
The OECD world  trade  model, originally  estimated  by Adams,  Eguchi, 
and  Meyer-zu-Schlochtern,  and  since  updated  by A. Yajima  and  Meyer-zu- 
Schlochtern,  provides  empirical  equations  explaining  the row and column 
sums of the trade  change  matrix,  given  a vector  of exchange  rate  changes, 
for seven major OECD countries-the United States, Canada, Japan, 
France, Germany,  Italy, the United Kingdom-and two residual  cate- 
gories-other OECD and non-OECD.27  Such row and column  sums are 
shown  at the bottom  of Tables  7-9 as changes  in total  exports  and  imports, 
respectively. 
This model,  referred  to here  as the Adams  model, uses  the export  share 
approach  to explain  total trade  flows.  For each  country  imports  depend  on 
domestic  production,  a demand  pressure  variable,  and import  prices  rela- 
tive to domestic  prices.  This approach  is modified  for other  OECD,  where 
production  alone appears  in the equation,  and for the non-OECD  group, 
whose imports  are assumed  to depend only on lagged foreign  exchange 
inflows.28 
The  total  import  sum  given  by these  individual  country  import  equations 
is then  divided  among  the countries  as exporters  by a series  of export  share 
equations.  Here  each country's  exports  are specified  as a function  of total 
27. The  original exposition of  the  model  is  Adams,  Eguchi, and  Meyer-zu- 
Schlochtern,  Econometric  Analysis  of International  Trade.  The updated  version,  on which 
this section is based, is given in the appendix  to F. Gerard  Adams and Helen B. Junz, 
"The Effect of the Business  Cycle on Trade Flows of Industrial  Countries,"  Journal  of 
Finance,  Vol. 26 (May 1971), pp. 251-68. 
28. See Adams and Junz,  "Effect  of the Business  Cycle," p. 267. Since no price  terms 
appear in the other OECD and non-OECD equations, these areas will  be dropped 
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imports,  export  prices  relative  to those of competing  exporters,  and do- 
mestic pressure  of demand  (with a negative  sign). In terms of the trade 
change  matrixes  of Tables  7, 8, and 9, the Adams  import  equations  deter- 
mine the column  sums for the relevant  countries.  These then total to an 
aggregate  import  change,  which  is then  shared  among  the export  row  sums 
as determined  by the export  share  equations. 
The Adams  model was originally  estimated  on quarterly  data covering 
the period 1955:4-1965:4. The updated  equations  given in the Adams- 
Junz  paper  are  estimated  on half-yearly  data  covering  the period  1955-68. 
In general,  the equations  do not have extensive  lag structures.  Of the 
eighteen  equations  for  exports  and  imports,  five  show  a lag of one half-year 
on an independent  variable,  and one has a two-period  lag. 
EMPIRICAL  ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
The updated  Adams moeel, estimated  like the Magee model in log- 
linear  form, yields the estimates  of total trade  value elasticities  shown in 
the Adams  columns  of Table 12. These  are the coefficients  of the relative 
price  terms  in equations  explaining  constant-dollar  trade  flows,  reduced  by 
one in absolute  value  to convert  them  to value  elasticities.  Half of the esti- 
mates are positive, indicating  that demand  elasticities  in those equations 
were  less than one in absolute  value. 
The total trade  value  elasticities  implicit  in the direct  elasticity  matrix  of 
Table  4, shown  as the a priori  estimates  in Table 12, can be calculated  as 
follows: On the export  side, the total value  elasticity  gives the change  in 
total exports-the row sums-as  a country's  own price  changes  or as all 
foreign  prices  change  together.  To obtain this estimate,  one can average 
the nondiagonal  elements  of the relevant  row of Table  4, using  as weights 
the fractions  of each  exporter's  total sales  taken  by each importer.  On the 
import  side, the total import  value  elasticity  plus the diagonal  element  of 
Table 4 must sum to  -2.0,  with the assumptions that oj =  3.0  and 7?7  = 
1.0.29 
29. If Si is the total import share in purchases  by  ] and di is the j total import elas- 
ticity, from text equation  (5), using Si +  Sij =  1, 
di +  1 =  -  (1 -  Si)a,  -  S,j  +  1 
=  -  Sir-  (1  -  Sij)  +  1. 
The expression  for djj +  1 from (5) is simply 
djj +  1 =  -  (1 - Sjj)-Sjn  +  1, 
Summed,  these two expressions  yield 
(di +  1) +  (dii +  1) =-  j--j  +  2, 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Table 12. A Priori and Adams Estimates of Total Trade Value 
Elasticities for Seven Major OECD Countries, 1971 
Exports  Imports 
Country  A prioria  AdamsD  A prioric  Adamsb 
United States  -1.61  0.17d  -1.46  0.59 
Canada  -1.88  0.21d  -0.61  -0.24 
Japan  -1.87  -0.12  -0.93  0.23 
France  -1.86  -0.41  -1.06  -0.49 
Germany  -1.73  -0.18  -0.95  0.73 
Italy  -1.92  -0.50  -0.85  -0.04 
United Kingdom  -1.88  0.76d  -0.76  1.OOe 
Sources: A priori-Table  4; Adams-F.  Gerard Adams and Helen B. Junz, "The Effect of the Business 
Cyele on Trade Flows of Industrial Countries,"  Journal  of Finance, Vol. 26 (May 1971), Appendix Table 1. 
a.  A priori  export value elasticities are the weighted averages of the appropriate  rows of Table 4, excluding 
diagonal elements. Weights are given by the share each importing country takes of the relevant country's 
total exports. Thus for each exporting country i, the total export value elasticity is given by 
>2d;,u  j#i.  iTii 
b. Export elasticities are unity plus the coefficients of PX (relative export unit value index) in each equa- 
tion in the Adams-Junz table cited-  under sources; import elasticities are the coefficients of PM (import unit 
value index) plus unity. The original equations are in real terms, in log-log form. (It should be noted that 
"TM" in the equation for Italy in the Adams-Junz table should be "PM.") 
c.  A priori total import value elasticities are simply -2.0  -  (di  -  1), or -2  plus the absolute values of 
the relevant diagonal elements of Table 4. 
d. Since the table shows value elasticities, a positive entry means that demand was inelastic-between  0 
and  -1.0-in  the Adams-Junz table. 
e.  No  price coefficient was given for U.K. imports in the Adams-Junz table, indicating an implied price 
elasticity of 0. 
The main impression  given  by Table 12 is that the price  elasticity  esti- 
mates  in the Adams  model are far too small.  Not one of the figures  from 
the Adams  model reported  in Table 12 is larger  in absolute  value  than its 
a priori  counterpart.  The highest  total export  price  elasticity  (in absolute 
value)  estimated  from the Adams  model is -1.41  for France;  the lowest 
a priori  estimate  is -2.61  for the United States.  On the import  side, the 
highest  Adams  value is -  1.49 for France;  the lowest a priori  estimate  is 
-1.61  for Canada. 
Thus  it is clear  that the Adams  model  will yield  much  smaller  estimates 
of the effects  of the exchange  rate realignments  than were obtained  from 
the Armington  model  even with  the elasticity  of substitution  set at 2.5, or 
from  the Magee  model.  This general  underestimation  of price coefficients 
in the Adams  model is quite understandable.  Price  terms  have at most a 
one-period  lag in half-yearly  terms  in the equations,  no attempt  was made 
to eliminate  simultaneous  equations  bias, and in general  the price series William H. Branson  49 
used are unit-value,  rather  than  fixed-weight,  indexes.30  The primary  pur- 
pose of the model  was to capture  the effect  of cyclical  movements  in busi- 
ness activity  on the matrix  of OECD trade, which it does quite success- 
fully,  rather  than  to provide  precise  estimates  of the effects  of exchange  rate 
changes. 
Nevertheless,  the distribution  of effects  from  the Adams  model,  as com- 
pared  with  their  general  level,  is of considerable  interest.  If the distribution 
among the seven major  OECD countries  is not too far from the earlier 
estimates  from the Armington  model, our confidence  in the a priori  esti- 
mates  will be increased. 
RESULTS FOR TOTAL TRADE  BALANCES 
The Adams  model can be used to estimate  the effects  of the exchange 
rate realignments.  First, the model can be run using actual values for 
independent  variables  to obtain a "base"  path for exports  and imports. 
The  base reported  here  is the same  as that  used  by Adams  and  Junz  earlier 
to study  the effects  of cyclical  developments.31  Next the model  can  be rerun 
changing  only relative  prices  by the amounts  indicated  by the vector of 
exchange  rate  changes  shown  in Table  6. Once  the lags in the system  have 
been worked out, the difference  between  the two paths of exports and 
imports  is the estimated  effect  of the realignment. 
Since  the model  has been  updated  only through  the second  half of 1968, 
the  realignment  was  assumed  to take  effect  at the beginning  of 1968,  and  the 
effect was measured  for the second half of  1969. The model gives the 
differential  results  in 1963  dollars  at half-yearly  rates.  These were  blown 
up to 1971  post-devaluation  prices  at annual  rates  using 1971  values  for 
export  and import  price  indexes. 
Since  the Adams  model gives the results  in real terms,  the actual 1971 
values  for the price  indexes  were used to calculate  the base exports  and 
imports  in 1971  dollars.  Then,  to allow  for the direct  effect  of the exchange 
rate  changes  on import  prices  in the United  States  and  export  prices  in the 
other countries,  all in dollars,  the U.S. import  price  index for 1971 was 
30. This means  that, for example,  when an export price rises and sales of that item 
fall, the weight  of the item in the index  falls.  Thus the price  change  is not fully  reflected  in 
the export unit value index, and its coefficient  in a demand equation  will be estimated 
with a downward  bias. 
31. See Adams and Junz, "Effect  of the Business  Cycle," p. 255. 50  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
increased  by 80 percent  of the weighted  average  U.S. devaluation,  using 
imports  as weights,  and foreign  export price indexes were adjusted  up- 
ward  in a similar  fashion.  These indexes  were  then used to put the alter- 
native  export  and import  values  into 1971  dollars. 
Table 13 shows  the average  percentage  revaluation  for the seven coun- 
tries  in the Adams  model,  weighted  alternatively  by that country's  exports 
and imports,  and  then each  country's  1971  export  and import  price  index, 
both actual  and  adjusted  as described  above.  The  actual  indexes  in Table  13 
Table  13. Weighted  Revaluations  and  Export  and  Import  Price Indexes 
for Seven  Major  OECD Countries,  1971 
Trade  price indexes,  1971 (1963 = 100) 
Weighted  revaluationa 
(percent)  Exports  Imports 
Country  Exports  Imports  Actual  Adjustedb  Actual  Adjustedb 
United States  -6.17  -7.14  125.3  125.3  126.2  133.3 
Canada  -1.87  -1.90  118.7  116.8  111.8  111.8 
Japan  13.62  13.47  110.2  122.3  106.1  106.1 
France  0.28  -0.02  132.5  134.0  124.6  124.6 
Germany  6.20  6.03  121.5  127.2  104.8  104.8 
Italy  -0.42  -0.42  116.1  115.8  121.7  121.7 
United Kingdom  2.96  2.93  141.3  144.7  132.3  132.3 
Sources: Weighted revaluation, derived from Tables 2, 3, and 6. Actual trade price indexes, International 
Monetary Fund, International  Finatncial  Statistics, Vol. 25 (March 1972), country tables, lines 74X and 75X 
when available, otherwise lines 74 and 75, and information supplied by IMF; adjusted trade price indexes, 
see note b. 
a.  For each country this is the percentage change in that country's currency value relative to all others, 
from Table 6, weighted alternatively by export and import shares. 
b.  To evaluate post-realignment  trade, the U.S. import price index and all other export price indexes were 
adjusted as described in the text. 
were used to evaluate  the base exports and imports, and the adjusted 
indexes were applied  to the alternative  path. The resulting  differentials, 
in 1971  dollars,  are shown  in Table 14.32 
The estimated  effects on the total trade balances  of the seven major 
OECD countries  calculated  from  the Adams  model and from  the a priori 
model of Table 8 are shown in Table 14  .33The  other OECD and non- 
32. The Adams  model  contains  no explicit  adjustment  for supply  elasticities.  Since  the 
results for total trade balances  from the Adams model are to be scaled up to the level 
shown  by the a priori  and Magee  models,  and only the distributions  studied,  and since  the 
supply adjustment  made above was a scale adjustment  also, no explicit adjustment 
for supply effects is made here. 
33. The estimates  of Table 14 were provided  by F. Gerard  Adams, along with some 
alternative  runs and advice on how to use the results,  in response  to my request  for help 
in preparing  this paper.  I should reemphasize  my debt to Adams here. William H. Branson  51 
Table  14. Adams  and  A Priori  Estimates  of the Effects  of the 1971 
Realignment  of Exchange  Rates  on Total  Trade  Balances,  Seven  Major 
OECD Countries 
Millions of 1971 U.S. dollars at annual rates 
Changes  in trade  flows 
Adams  modela 
Country  Exports  Imports  Balance  A priori 
United States  3,700.0  850.0  2,850.0  7,960.9 
Canada  570.0  100.0  470.0  955.5 
Japan  -260.0  1,350.0  -1,610.0  -6,216.9 
France  30.0  -190.0  220.0  -213.5 
Germany  -880.0  220.0  -1,100.0  -5,161.1 
Italy  100.0  -300.0  400.0  95.8 
United Kingdom  440.0  0  440.0  -1,101.9 
Sources: Adams model-estimated,  derived by F. Gerard Adams using the price indexes in Table 13; 
a priori model-Table  8, change in trade balance entry. 
a.  The estimates were calculated on a base of second-half 1969 trade, in 1963 dollars, which were con- 
verted to annual rates and 1971 price levels using the price indexes in Table 13. Complete 1971 data were 
available only for the United States and Japan. For the other five countries the price adjustment was made 
using the average for January-November 1971. 
OECD estimates  from the Adams  model are not reported  because  of the 
absence  of price  terms  on their  import  equations. 
Considering  the many differences  among  the sources  of the estimates, 
the distributions  of trade  balance  effects  of the 1971  realignment  among  the 
United States,  Japan,  and Germany  are reasonably  similar.  The country 
with  the largest  increase  in surplus  is the United  States,  while  the two with 
major  decreases,  Japan  and Germany,  appear  in the same  rank  order.  The 
small German  and Japanese  effects  relative  to the U.S. effect,  reported  in 
Table 14, may be due to the lack of response  of the ROW  trade  balance, 
compared  with the response  reported  in Table 8. 
Substantial  discrepancies  appear,  however,  in the  cases  of the other  coun- 
tries,  the largest  in the estimates  of the effects  on U.K. trade.  According 
to the a priori  model, the U.K. trade balance  falls by about $1 billion. 
But the Adams model shows no effect for imports  and an increase  for 
exports.  The import  result  reflects  the elasticity  estimate  of Table 12: The 
U.K. import  equation  in the Adams  model  has no price  term.  In addition 
the  model  showed  no change  in U.K. exports  in real  terms,  so that,  with  the 
U.K. export  price  index  rising  (Table  13),  U.K. exports  in dollar  terms  rise. 
This result suggests  that the effect on the U.K. trade balance  may be 
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tributional  results  from  the Adams  model  are only  broadly  consistent  with 
the a priori  results  of Table  8 in the cases  of the United  States,  Japan,  and 
Germany. 
The  Timing  of the Effects  on Trade  Balances 
The last three  sections  have given  estimates  of the long-run  equilibrium 
effects of the exchange  rate realignment,  with no attention  paid to the 
timing  of their  occurrence.  None of the three  models  contains  much  infor- 
mation about timing: The Armington  model uses a theoretical,  com- 
parative-static  approach;  the Magee model is estimated  on annual data 
with no lags; and the Adams  model uses semi-annual  data with at most 
one half-year  lag. 
This lack of information  on price lags is characteristic  of empirical 
models of trade.  For example,  the original  work  by Rhomberg  and Bois- 
sonneault  for  the Brookings  model  and  my model  in 1968  both  used  Koyck 
lags,  lumping  the price  lag in with  all the other  variables  in the equation.34 
The  more  recent  quarterly  model  by Kwack,  which  is part  of the Brookings 
model, has no price  lags, as is also the case in Marston's  recent  model of 
U.K. import  demand.35  Timing,  therefore,  warrants  a separate  discussion. 
Timing  raises  once more a question  asked  at the outset: Do exporters 
pass through  the exchange  rate changes  in the form of changes in the 
foreign  currency  prices  of their  exports,  or let profits  absorb  them,  holding 
foreign  currency  prices  constant?  If pass-through  dominates,  evidence  from 
experience  with  everyday  price  changes  would  be relevant,  and  the quantity 
adjustments  would come basically  from changes  existing  firms  make in 
their output  levels. If profits  bear  the brunt,  the quantity  adjustment  will 
34. See Rudolf R. Rhomberg  and Lorette Boissonneault,  "The Foreign Sector," in 
James S. Duesenberry,  Gary Fromm, Lawrence  R. Klein, and Edwin Kuh (eds.), The 
Brookings  Quarterly  Econometric  Model of the United  States (Rand McNally, 1965), 
and William H. Branson, "A Disaggregated  Model of the U.S. Balance of Trade," 
Staff Economic Studies 44 (Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System, Feb- 
ruary  1968;  processed). 
35. See Sung  Y. Kwack  and  George  R. Schink,  "A Disaggregated  Quarterly  Model of 
United States  Trade  and Capital  Flows: Simulations  and Tests of Policy EfThctiveness" 
(presented  at the Brookings  Conference  on Econometric  Model Building  and Develop- 
ment, February  1972; processed),  and Richard  Marston,  "Income  Effects  and Delivery 
Lags in British  Import Demand: 1955-67,"  Journal  of International  Economics,  Vol. 1 
(November 1971), pp. 375-99. William H. Branson  53 
come later  with entry  into the export  industry  in the upvaluing  countries 
and exit in the devaluing  countries,  a process  that should  involve  a much 
longer  period  of adjustment  than the pass-through  case. 
PASS-THROUGH  IN  1971 
To the extent  that the exchange  rate  changes  are passed  through-that 
is, that  the shifts  illustrated  in Figure  1 are  actually  occurring-fairly  small 
changes  in export  price  indexes  should  develop,  measured  in the domestic 
currency  of the exporter,  and larger  changes  in the foreign  currency  prices 
of exports.  On the assumption  of a 0.2 supply  adjustment,  the exporters' 
prices  in their domestic  currencies  should change  by 20 percent  of their 
average  exchange  rate  change,  while  the prices  in foreign  exchange  should 
move  by 80 percent  of the change  in the exchange  rate.  This  means  that in 
devaluing  countries  the domestic  currency  price  index of imports  should 
be rising  substantially,  while in upvaluing  countries  it should be falling. 
Some  evidence  on these  price  movements  is assembled  in Figure  2, which 
shows  movements  in the domestic  currency  export  and  import  price  indexes 
for the three  major  countries  with  the biggest  exchange  rate  changes,  Ger- 
many,  Japan,  and the United States. 
The average  German  revaluation  from  April 30 to December  31, 1971, 
was 6.20 percent,  weighted  by German  exports  in 1971,  and 6.03 percent, 
weighted  by imports.  Complete  pass-through  of the revaluation,  with a 20 
percent  supply  adjustment,  would  lead  to a drop  of 1.24  percent  in German 
export prices and a drop of 4.82 in import prices,  compared  with what 
would have obtained  otherwise.  A clear drop in both indexes  relative  to 
trend  values  is obvious  from  April 1971.  By December  the German  export 
price  index was about 2.7 percent  lower, and the import  index about 4.3 
percent  lower,  than  their  extrapolated  trend  values.36  Taken  at face value, 
these  data suggest  that by the end of 1971  all but 1.5 percentage  points  of 
the revaluation  had  been  passed  through  by German  exporters,  and all but 
0.5 point by importers.  At the least, these data do not suggest  that pass- 
through  is a problem  in the German  case. 
The average  Japanese  revaluation  from  April  30 to December  31, 1971, 
was 13.6 percent  weighted  by exports  and 13.5 percent  weighted  by im- 
36. The data in Figure  2 are not seasonally  adjusted,  and there  seems  to be a seasonal 
drop  in the German  import  price  index  from  around  March-April  to October-November. 
But the December  values all are quite near their trend  values except for 1971. 54  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1972 
Figure  2. Indexes  of Export  and  Import  Prices,  Germany,  Japan,  and  the 
United  States,  Monthly,  1969-72 
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ports.  Again with a 20 percent  supply  adjustment,  these  changes  suggest  a 
drop  of 2.72 in the index  of Japanese  export  prices,  and a drop  of 10.80  in 
the import price index. A definite  drop in Japanese  export and import 
prices  from mid-1971  is apparent  in Figure  2. Judging  by 1970  patterns, 
part  of this might  be seasonal,  but not all. On the export  side, an extension 
of the trend  beginning  in early 1970  might  have  taken  the index  to 111  by 
January  1972, as opposed to the actual 108.1, suggesting  a drop in yen 
export prices of about 2.6 percent, well within the range of full pass- 
through.  On the import  side,  the actual  value  in January  was 100.7,  about 
7.6 percent  below a rough  trend  value  of 109,  indicating  that importers  in 
Japan  passed  through  perhaps  three-quarters  of the effect  by January  1972. 
The U.S. indexes  are much  harder  to interpret  than  the plausible  move- 
ments  in the German  and Japanese  cases. The January  values  of both in- 
dexes  are  clearly  below trend,  exports  more  than imports.  The shortfall  of 
the export  price  index  may be due to the price  freeze,  although  the sharp 
drop  came  from  April  to June  1971.  Import  prices  seemed  to be moving  up 
fairly well until December  1971, when the index dropped  from 129.2 to 
127.0;  the rise was resumed  in January. 
This lack of response  of U.S. dollar  import  prices  to the devaluation  is 
not necessarily  inconsistent  with  the  DM and  yen export  prices  of Germany 
and  Japan,  which  moved  about  as expected.  On  the other  hand,  it may  indi- 
cate  that  Japanese  and German  exporters  are,  to a large  extent,  not passing 
through  the exchange  rate changes,  but rather  are holding  dollar prices 
fairly  constant  while  home  currency  prices  fall a bit. Thus,  such  as it is, the 
evidence  concerning  pass-through  is mixed. The exchange  rate changes 
seem  to be passed  through  on the import  side in Japan  and Germany,  but 
the results  for U.S. imports  are open to some doubt. 
In general,  I would  say that the realignments  are not being  fully passed 
through,  especially  on the side of U.S. imports.  This means  that, in addi- 
tion to the possibility  of a short-run  increase  in import  payments  in U.S. 
dollars  due  to the short-run  inelasticity  of demand,  the favorable  effects  of 
the devaluation  on the import  side may  take  substantially  longer  to appear 
than econometric  evidence  on normal  price  lags would  suggest. 
EVIDENCE  ON PRICE LAGS 
As noted  earlier,  econometric  studies  of trade  flows  have  tended  to focus 
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problem  of price  lags.37  However,  a study  by Bruce  T. Grimm,  completed 
in 1968, focused on just this problem.38  Grimm  estimated  equations  on 
quarterly  data  for U.S. exports  and  imports  by end-use  categories  covering 
the period  from 1954:1  to 1966:4.  He used the Almon  technique  for esti- 
mating  distributions  of coefficients  of lagged income, activity,  and price 
variables  in the equations.  His results for the lengths of price lags are 
summarized  in Table  15.39 
Table 15. Estimates of Length of Price Lag in U.S. Export and Import 
Equations, 1954-66 Quarterly Data 
Quarters 
Exports  Imports 
Category  Lag lengtha  Category  Lag lengtha 
Crude materials  1  Industrial  supplies 
Foodstuffs  5  and materials  5 
Semimanufactures  6b  Food, feed, and beverages  2c 
Finished manufactures  1  Capital  goods  3 
Electrical  machinery  5  Consumer  goods  1 
Autos and parts  7  Autos and parts  5 
Other  1 
Source: Bruce T. Grimm, "An Analysis of the Lagged Determinants  of United States Import and Export 
Components" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1968). 
a.  A one-quarter lag length indicates that only the contemporaneous value of the relative price term 
enters the equation. 
b. Semimanufacture exports were found to be price inelastic, so the total coefficient in Grimm's value 
equation is positive. See Grimm, p. 107. 
c.  Food, feed, and beverage imports were also found to be price inelastic in demand. 
Many of Grimm's  results  are puzzling,  especially  the single-period  lags 
on exports  of crude  materials  and finished  manufactures  and on imports 
of consumer  goods. Also, it is not clear  why the capital  goods import  lag 
is so short;  nor why  most of the price  lags  in the export  equations  were  not 
statistically  significant,  although  they had reasonable  shapes.40 
Where  lags were  apparent,  they were  concentrated  in distributions  with 
lengths of five to seven quarters,  with peaks in the second through  the 
fourth  quarters.  A certain  consistency  in the results  points to a lag length 
37. There is good reason for this. As noted earlier,  the price data are generally  unit- 
value indexes  instead  of sampled,  fixed-weight  indexes.  They also exhibit  a high  degree  of 
serial  correlation. 
38. Bruce  T. Grimm,  "An Analysis  of the Lagged  Determinants  of United States  Im- 
port and Export  Components"  (Ph.D. thesis, University  of Pennsylvania,  1968). 
39. See Grimm's  Chapter  4, pp. 126-39, for a more detailed  summary  of the results 
and for graphs  of the price  lags. 
40. This is noted by Grimm, p. 133. William H. Branson  57 
covering  perhaps  one and one-half  to two years, with the peaks of the 
adjustment  coming  perhaps  one year after  the price  change. 
Thus to the extent  that the exchange  rate changes  are passed through, 
and that the evidence  from these U.S. trade equations  is relevant, we 
should  expect  to see adjustment  begin in a year's  time after the realign- 
ments-toward the end of 1972-with the full effect  appearing  by the end 
of 1973. This conclusion  should apply to the U.S. export side. But the 
possibility  that the changes are not being passed through on the U.S. 
import  side suggests  that the lags there  may extend  well beyond 1973. 
Summary 
The  a priori  estimates  using  the Armington  framework  and  the  empirical 
estimates  from  the Magee  model  point to a central  estimate  of a swing  of 
$7 billion  to $8 billion in the U.S. trade  balance  due to the exchange  rate 
realignments  of 1971,  with  more  than  half appearing  as exports.  The other 
major  increases  in trade  balances  from  the realignment  come in the non- 
industrial  countries-the ROW ($6 billion) and Canada  ($1 billion), al- 
though  the gain  to the ROW  is surely  overstated.  The  countries  with  major 
reductions  in trade  surpluses  are  Japan  ($6 billion),  Germany  ($5 billion), 
and the United  Kingdom  ($1 billion). 
These estimates,  from Table 8, give the effects of the exchange  rate 
changes  alone,  holding  all else constant;  they are not predictions  of actual 
changes.  They also do not build in reactions  of income  or the price  level 
to the initial  effects;  they represent  the exogenous  net export  effects the 
macro  forecasters  should  feed into their  models.  They also are full effects 
without  a timing  dimension,  and thus do not allow for possible short-run 
inelasticities  in demand  and supply  schedules. 
Very  little of use has been published  on the timing  question.  The study 
by Bruce  Grimm  suggests  that the effects  of the realignments  should be 
visible  by the end of 1972  (assuming  nothing  else changes  too much),  and 
that most of the pass-through  effect  should  come by the end of 1973.  But 
it is very hard to see how the conventional  wisdom became so firmly 
settled on a two-year  lag. Presumably  the people who form it are not 
closely  acquainted  with  the Grimm  study.4'  And the two-year  lag estimate 
41. While  I have heard  the British  experience  since 1967  used  to confirm the conven- 
tional wisdom, it is hard to know why. The turn to surplus  in U.K. trade was closely 
connected with its worst postwar  recession, and even the National  Institute  Economic 
Review  has not published  an attempt  to disentangle  the effects of devaluation  from the 
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does not allow  for the possibility  that  absorption  will spread  out the effects 
beyond 1973.  But to the extent  that the realignments  are passed through, 
the popular  guess of a two-year  lag does turn out to be a best guess, as 
far as I can tell. 
This  paper  has produced  fairly  large  estimates  of the partial  effects  of the 
exchange  rate  realignments  on trade  balances,  especially  that of the United 
States.  But this should not be taken as a projection  of the actual move- 
ments  in the U.S. trade  balance  over  the next  year  or so, for at least three 
reasons.  Two have been mentioned:  The partial  effects themselves  will 
take  time  to appear,  and  they  will tend  to generate  price  and  income  move- 
ments  that,  in turn,  will  reduce  the impact  of the realignments  on trade  bal- 
ances. The third reason is that the trade balance  is highly sensitive to 
short-run  cyclical  changes  in income.  With  the U.S. economy  expected  to 
expand  relatively  more rapidly  than Europe's  over the next year or so, 
downward  cyclical  pressure  will be exerted  on the trade  balance.  One pro- 
jection by Stephen  Magee shows a deterioration  from cyclical forces of 
some $2 billion  from 1971  to 1972.  Thus  the short-run  movements  in trade 
balances  may well be dominated  by cyclical  changes  in demand.  But the 
long-run  effect  of the devaluation  over  the next two or three  years  will be 
to reduce  substantially  the U.S. trade  deficit. Comments  and  Discussion 
Lawrence  R. Klein: All economists  may be divided into four groups: 
(1) trade  elasticity  optimists;  (2) trade  elasticity  pessimists;  (3) those who 
have no a priori  opinion;  and (4) those who don't care.  William  Branson 
is an optimist,  and I am a pessimist.  He takes his opinion on intuition, 
while  I go strictly  with  the econometric  evidence.  He is in good company, 
however,  joining  an impressive  array  of students  of trade  theory  who share 
his intuition  and are  quite  willing  to recommend  trade  policy  on this basis. 
In addition  to my concern  over  the lack of hard  evidence  on the magni- 
tude of trade  elasticities,  I question  the methodology  of the approach.  The 
problems  being  studied  cannot  be answered  in terms  of trade  relationships 
alone. Trade  policies will have repercussions  on the domestic  economies 
of the trading  nations, and these must be taken into account  in a fully 
consistent  way.  Also, counter  or support  measures,  as the case  may  be, will 
be taken in the domestic  economies  concerned  and will feed back on the 
trading  system.  Branson  tells us that his estimates  of the impact of the 
realignments  should "be fed into macroeconomic  models that will then 
calculate  the feedbacks  for  whatever  path  is assumed  for government  policy 
variables."  His results,  however,  provide  only  the first  iteration  of the solu- 
tion of a complicated  feedback  mechanism  between  domestic  and trade 
sectors of the world economy, and without an explicit structure  of the 
mechanism,  it is questionable  whether  he has obtained  an indicative  esti- 
mate of the outcome. 
First, let me develop some ideas on elasticity  optimism  or pessimism. 
Branson  suggests  that estimates  of demand  elasticities  are expected  to be 
between  -2.0  and -3.0.  For some commodities  in some bilateral  move- 
ments, own-price  elasticities  may be this large, but overall imports  and 
exports  in given  countries  do not seem  to be that sensitive  to relative  price 
changes.  In the case  of the United  States,  between  one-fourth  and  one-third 
of both exports  and imports  are in basic materials,  food, or beverages. 
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These  goods are not particularly  price  elastic.  This  is especially  important 
on the side of U.S. imports,  where  devaluation  of the dollar will simply 
mean  higher  outlays  for coffee,  tea, cocoa, sugar,  oil, and basic  materials. 
Manufactures  are more  elastic,  but after  extensive  study of this group, 
subdivided  by cars and all other,  the best values  I can find are -1.3  for 
manufactures  excluding  road motor vehicles' and -2.1  for road motor 
vehicles.  For the total import  mix the overall  elasticity  is somewhere  be- 
tween -1.0  and -1.5.  Services  are  not likely  to make  the total import  bill 
more  elastic.  These  elasticity  estimates  are used in the U.S. import  equa- 
tions  for  the LINK model,2  and  have  been  obtained  after  careful  allowance 
for lags, price measurement,  and many  disturbing  factors  in world  mar- 
kets. 
Oil requirements  are a particularly  disturbing  aspect on the horizon  of 
American  import performance  that Branson overlooks in his calcula- 
tions. Considering  the institutional  structure  of the world  petroleum  mar- 
ket, we have come to regard  SITC 3 imports  as exogenous  in the U.S. 
part of the LINK system.  Industry  specialists  feel that the United States 
is near  capacity  in the use of domestic  petroleum  resources  and that, even 
allowing  for retrieval  from  the North Slope in Alaska,  major  oil imports 
will grow  during  the rest  of the decade,  increasing  from  3.4 million  barrels 
per day in 1970  to 7.3 million  barrels  per day in 1975,  and to 10.7  million 
barrels  per day in 1980.  Allowing  for annual  price  increments  of 25 cents 
per barrel  in 1972, 11 cents in 1973, and 5-7 cents over the rest of the 
decade, projections  of the Wharton  long-term  model with exogenously 
added  oil imports  suggest  that all the trade  balance  gains  of the new eco- 
nomic  policy  (NEP) realized  by 1974-75  in the form  of a positive  balance 
fade away and that net exports  are a negligible  quantity  by 1977.  In this 
case, rising  prices  and rising  imports  result  in a perverse  effect  for Bran- 
son's  type of analysis. 
On the side of exports,  the elasticities  are not much larger.  National 
export  equations  are not used explicitly  in the LINK system  because  they 
are determined  through  the trade  matrix  in a world  simulation  solution; 
nevertheless,  separate  estimates  of export  equations  are available  for each 
model.  The  U.S. results  indicate  elasticities  of -  1.3  for all goods  excluding 
1. Standard  international  trade classification  (SITC) 5-9 excluding  732 (road motor 
vehicles). 
2. LINK is a project  that aims  to build  a world  economic  model by linking  the models 
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Table 1. Estimates of Long-run  Price Elasticities from the 
LINK Econometric  Model 
Imports, by SITC classificationa 
Country  0,1  2,4  3  5-9  Exports 
Japan  b  b  b  -0.692  -2.378 
Germany  -0.956  b  -1.577  -1.677  -1.682 
United  Kingdom  b  b  b  b  -0.711 
Italy  -1.663  -0.521  b  -1.130  -0.720 
Canada  -0.961  -0.303  -0.811  -2.492  -0.587 
Netherlands  -0.420  -0.420  b  -0.490  -2.390 
Belgium  -1.055  b  -0.653  b  -2.580 
Sweden  b  b  b  b  -1.920 
Austria  b  -0.077  b  b  n.a. 
Finland  b  -0.500  b  -0.750 
Source: LINK models. 
a.  The standard international trade classifications cover the following commodities: 
0, 1-food  and beverages. 
2, 4--crude  materials and animal and vegetable oils and fats. 
3-mineral  fuels, lubricants, and related materials. 
5-9-manufactures. 
b. Not statistically significant. 
n.a. Not available. 
military grant-aid and road motor vehicles, and  -1.16  for road motor 
vehicles.3 
The  other LINK  models for individual countries have elasticity esti- 
mates that are either in the same general range as the U.S.  estimates or 
lower (see Table 1). Japanese, Dutch, and Belgian exports are fairly elastic, 
and so are Canadian manufactured imports; but most of the others are 
quite inelastic-below  2.0 in absolute value and often below 1.0. Branson 
suggests that the Adams trade model underestimates effects on the United 
Kingdom because the import equation has no price term and a low price 
elasticity of exports. The London Business School model in LINK agrees 
with the Adams results. There is no valid empirical evidence of significant 
price effects on imports; some discrete effects are noticeable in connec- 
tion with the import surcharge, but no statistically significant price vari- 
ables. As in the other LINK studies, this result comes after extensive and 
careful testing for price effects and lag distributions. The data do not show 
what many trade analysts insist must follow  from their intuitive insight. 
LINK econometricians have been quite aware of the problems of lag re- 
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sponse.  They  have searched  carefully  for estimates  of lagged  price  effects, 
but have found little empirical  evidence  to support  popular  hypotheses. 
Branson  argues  that the Adams  model underestimates  price  coefficients 
generally  because  it does not have  long enough  lags and does  not deal  with 
simultaneous  equations  bias. These are things worth looking at, but I 
doubt that they are really  responsible  for serious  underestimates.  Rather 
long lags,  up to three  and four  years  in duration,  have  not been studied  in 
depth,  a fact  that  may  have  some  bearing  on the results;  but the real  prob- 
lems for good estimates  of trade  elasticities  are in obtaining  proper  price 
data and taking account of disturbing  factors.  The key disturbances  to 
U.S. postwar  trade have been (1) U.S. stockpile purchases  during the 
Korean  War;  (2) the closing  of the Suez  Canal;  (3) frost  in Brazil;  (4) dock 
strikes;  (5) the Canadian  automobile  agreement;  (6) P.L. 480; (7) U.S. 
foreign  aid; and (8) Canadian  wheat  sales to China  and the USSR. Most 
of these  influences  have been carefully  monitored  and dealt with  by some 
special statistical  treatment  in LINK studies.  We have worked hard at 
getting  good estimates  of the trade  equations,  yet we find no evidence  to 
support  the assumed  values  of elasticities  used by Branson. 
As to simulation  of the world  economy,  the Armington  model used by 
Branson  has great  mathematical  elegance  but must  be based  on a number 
of highly  restrictive  assumptions  in order  to be applied.  I find  implausible 
the implications  of the generalized  CES function  relating  total trade to 
several  bilateral  flows. The elasticity  of substitution  between  any pair of 
bilateral  arguments  must be identical.  This does not seem to be realistic. 
The trade  model  of the Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and De- 
velopment,  and  its extension  by Adams,  is a useful  construction,  but it does 
not deal fully  with  the problem  of judging  the effects  of the new exchange 
rate  realignments. 
The LINK system,  in a nutshell,  interrelates  existing  large-  and  medium- 
scale econometric  models across  major  industrial  countries  and regional 
groupings  of the developing  countries  through  the world  trade  matrix  in a 
consistent  way that preserves  trade accounting  identities-world exports 
equal  world  imports;  import  prices  equal  export  prices  on average-while 
seeking  a compatible  simultaneous  solution  for the global economy.  This 
solution  gives  values  for both trade  flows and domestic  variables  for each 
country.  The models used are described  in more detail in ITEMS and 
LINK working  papers.4 
4. Social Science  Research  Council,  ITEMS, Vol. 23 (December  1969);  Vol. 24 (De- 
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The principal  result in the LINK simulations  for 1971 and 1972 are 
that,  for both  years,  the introduction  of NEP reduced  the volume  of world 
trade  below the path that otherwise  it would  have followed: 
Without  NEP  With  NEP 
(billions  of 1963  dollars) 
1971  258.2  257.5 
1972  275.9  274.0 
Given  the modest  estimates  of trade  elasticities  in almost  all country  mod- 
els, the results  are  different  in magnitude  for nominal  and  real  magnitudes. 
For example,  the U.S. balance  should become  positive  in real terms  but 
smaller  or even slightly  negative  in nominal  terms.  The developing  coun- 
tries should  improve  their balance  in real but not in nominal  terms,  and 
similar  differences  occur  for other  countries.  For covering  deficits  in pay- 
ments balances,  nominal  trade  figures  are more important  than real; for 
studying  the  immediate  effect  on growth  and  employment,  real  trade  figures 
are more  important. 
The impact  is slight  in 1971  since  the policies  were  in effect  for only part 
of the year. Although  the $2.0 billion effect  estimated  for 1972  may also 
seem to be small, it consists  of the mutual  offsetting  of fairly  large  shifts 
for the United States,  Canada,  and the developing  countries  on the one 
hand and Germany,  Japan,  Italy, France,  and Belgium  on the other  (see 
Tables  2 and 3). These  country  line-ups  generally  agree  with  Branson's  but 
he does not consider  the developing  countries  in any detail and deletes 
France  and Italy from  the list of countries  losing  trade  on balance. 
Our  finding  of insensitivity  of the United  Kingdom  is in agreement  with 
Branson's  estimates.  Also, the downward  adjustment  by Germany  and 
Japan, and upward  adjustment  by Canada  and the United States,  agree 
with his independent  calculations. 
For the developing  countries,  the United  Nations Conference  on Trade 
and Development  has developed  four regional  models for LINK: Africa 
(excluding  Libya);  South and East Asia; Latin  America;  and the Middle 
East  and Libya.  They  show  no real  change  for the Middle  East,  substantial 
changes  for Africa,  and  sizable  trade  changes  for Latin  America.  The Mid- 
dle East trade  is dominated  by oil and ought not to change  in real  terms. 
Moriguchi,  and Alain Van Peeterssen,  "NEP in the World  Economy:  Simulation  of the 
International  Transmission  Mechanism,"  LINK Working  Paper No. 2 (University of 
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Table 2.  Effects of New Economic Policy on Trade and Output, 
Developed Countries,  1972 
Values with NEP minus values without NEP 
Goods F.O.B.8 
Country  Importsb  Exportsg  GNPC  Imports  Exports 
Belgium  -0.2  -17.3  -5.0  1.27  1.13 
Canada  0.1  1.2  0.4  0.82  2.11 
France  -0.5  -5.8  -10.0  1.35  1.39 
Germany  0.0  -2.9  -5.0  2.04  4.37 
Italy  -0.7  -1,100.0  -1,200.0  1.56  1.27 
Japan  -0.4  -1.2d  -700.0e  1.41  2.83 
Netherlands  -0.2  0.5  -0.4  -0.13  0.97 
Sweden  0.0  0.4f  -0  3f  0.47  0.73 
United Kingdom  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.35  2.00 
United States  0.5  4.19  1.59  3.61  3.57 
Source:  LINK models. 
a.  Billions of current U.S. dollars. 
b. Billions of 1963 dollars. 
c.  Billions of 1963 national currency units, except as noted. 
d.  Billions of 1965 U.S. dollars. 
e.  Billions of 1965 yen. 
f.  Billions of 1959 kroner. 
g. Billions of 1958 U.S. dollars. 
Table 3.  Effects of the New Economic Policy on Trade, Output, and 
Prices of Developing  Areas, 1972 
Values  with NEP minus values without NEP, in billions of 1960 U.S. dollars 
Gross 
domestic  Terms  of 
Area  Imports  Exports  product  tradea 
Africa (excluding  Libya)  -0.3  0.4  0.8  -3.8 
South and East Asia  0.0  0.1  0.0  -4.2 
Latin America  -0.2  0.8  0.0  -4.2 
Middle East and Libya  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.5 
Source: LINK models. 
a. (PX/PM) 100, where  PX is the price index of exports and PM the price index of imports, both in U.S. 
dollars on a 1960 base. 
In order  to get a fuller  picture  of the expected  effects  on the developing 
world,  however,  I have  added  figures  on dollar  terms  of trade  (see  Table  3). 
The predicted  deterioration  in terms  of trade for developing  countries 
suggests  that real improvements  of trade  balances  will be associated  with 
deterioration  in nominal  terms.  The nominal  increments  in goods imports 
(f.o.b.) for all developing  countries  is estimated  at $5.65 billion against 
$3.35  billion  for goods exports  (f.o.b.). For future  years,  this will cut into 
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There are two particular  comments  on Branson's  paper  that I should 
like to add. He argues  that quoted export prices  will fall as a result of 
devaluation  for two reasons: 
(1) Mobility of capital and labor will eliminate  excessive profits in 
export  industries;  and 
(2) with  U.S. industry  operating  at low capacity  utilization,  export  price 
reactions  on the supply side should be below average  sample  ex- 
perience. 
The assumption  about mobility  of labor and capital  is consistent  with 
Branson's  elasticity  optimism.  He is placing  much  faith  in a rapid,  smooth- 
working,  and sizable  adjustment  process  that I find  to be unrealistic. 
Based  on my reading  of the Wharton  capacity  utilization  index,  I would 
be reluctant  to put great weight on capacity  utilization,  as a favorable 
factor.  It is not so low as to warrant  a special  adjustment  to export  prices 
below average  experience  in the sample  period. 
Hendrik  Houthakker:  I found  this  paper  very  illuminating.  The  theoretical 
exposition  based  on Armington's  model  is very  clear  and very  useful,  but 
there  remains  in my mind  a basic  question  as to the economic  logic of the 
Armington  model. 
International  trade  theory  has traditionally  been formulated  in terms  of 
commodities  rather  than countries,  and neither  Armington  nor Branson 
provides  the convincing  link between  a commodity  model and a country 
model  that needs  to be forged  at some point. Moreover,  the uniform  elas- 
ticity of substitution  is a main theoretical  weakness  of the Armington 
model.  In that  respect,  I am more  sympathetic  to Stephen  Magee's  assump- 
tion that the elasticity  may vary. 
As Branson  himself  indicates,  the empirical  results  in his paper  are  really 
not ve:ry  new.  This  is partly  the result  of selection  of sources.  The Arming- 
ton model as such does not provide  any empirical  results,  and  though  the 
results  Branson  derives  from it agree with those updated  from Magee's 
work,  this is not reassuring,  since we cannot reinforce  a purely  empirical 
by a purely  theoretical  model.  He therefore  does not add much  support  to 
Magee's  findings,  which  to my mind  are useful  and convincing. 
Perhaps  I should  reaffirm  that I am an elasticity  optimist.  My optimism 
is based  in part  on the work  that Magee  and  I have  done  together,  and  also 
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of Rudolf Rhomberg, R. J. Ball and K.  Marwah, and Mordecai E. 
Kreinin.  Their  estimates  of overall  price  elasticities  are similar  to ours. 
Branson's  empirical  verification  of the size of the elasticities  leaves  some- 
thing  to be desired.  He attempts  to incorporate  the Adams  OECD  model, 
but then rejects  it on the ground  that its elasticities  are so small.  I wish  he 
had tried more seriously  to find the source  of the discrepancies  between 
that model and others.  That is why I am not completely  convinced,  after 
reading  Branson's  paper,  that he really  has supported  Magee's  results  as 
strongly  as it appears  at first  sight. 
One  particularly  important  question  is what  happens  to trade  flows  after 
the initial effects  of a revaluation  have been exhausted,  that is, what the 
second-  and third-round  effects  are in trade models. The issue is all the 
more  pertinent  in light of a recent  paper  by Arthur  Laffer.  On the basis  of 
short  time  series  for a number  of countries  that  made  exchange  rate  adjust- 
ments at some time during  the last fifteen years, he maintains  that the 
results of exchange  rate adjustments  are transitory.  In virtually  all the 
cases, Laffer  finds that the effect of the exchange  rate adjustment  is ex- 
hausted  in approximately  three  years.  This disturbing  result  is not based 
on any detailed  analysis,  but the gross  empirical  evidence  is quite  contrary 
to what optimists,  including  myself,  would  have believed. 
Sir Alec  Cairncross:  I should  like to comment  from  a British  point of view 
on some of the issues  raised  by Branson's  paper. 
Obviously,  the size of elasticities  is a relative  matter,  depending  on the 
time period:  They are smaller  in the short run than in the long run. It 
therefore  makes  a big difference  whether  or not there  is a great  hurry  to 
get the balance of payments  into equilibrium.  In the British  case, we 
thought  speed was at a premium;  thus, we were  very disappointed  to see 
first  a deterioration  in 1968,  and then a very  slow improvement  until well 
into 1969.  Maybe,  in the case of the American  balance  of payments,  quick 
results  may be less vital because  not many good alternatives  to holding 
dollars  exist. 
In the British  case, the prospect  of a high elasticity  is greater  on the 
export  side than on the import  side. British  exporters  sell to a very large 
world market outside the country, and the exports are almost entirely 
manufactures.  These  features  make  for  high  elasticities.  On  the  import  side, 
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elasticity.  In addition,  domestic  producers  who compete  with imports  will 
act to reduce  the magnitude  of shifts  in the market. 
The rate of expansion  of the U.S. domestic  economy  today is probably 
faster  than that of the world  economy  as a whole, and that must  substan- 
tially affect  the situation.  In the British  case we slowed down before we 
devalued  and continued  to slow down  thereafter,  which  had quite  an effect 
on the balance  of payments.  The impact  of the U.K. exchange  rate  adjust- 
ment has not been disentangled  from  that cyclical  effect. 
In general,  demand  effects  tend  to swamp  cost effects  in movements  from 
year to year. Even in tracing  shifts in the balance  of trade of the main 
industrial  countries  from the early 1950s  to the late 1960s,  it is hard to 
identify  the effects  of changes  in competitive  position  indicated  by export 
and import  prices.  Usually,  one finds  a very  slow and progressive  loss (or 
gain)  of competitive  power  rather  than  any dramatic  change  in the balance 
of trade. 
In the British  case,  most  people  sensed  a major  loss in competitive  power 
during  the 1960s,  but the change  in the balance  of trade over a ten- or 
fifteen-year  period  was  pretty  small  in relation  to the movement  in the price 
and  cost indexes.  That  certainly  led us to feel  the elasticities  must  be low- 
that the sum of the export  and import  price  elasticities  might  not be tre- 
mendously  above  unity. 
Finally,  the feedback  from  devaluation  in  jacking  up domestic  costs and 
prices  weakens  the net impact  on the trade  balance.  The cost of raw ma- 
terials moves up. Higher prices may lead to demands  for higher wage 
settlements.  The  latter  may  be a less important  consequence  of devaluation 
in the U.S. case  than  in the British  case,  because  U.S. imports  are  so much 
less significant  in the U.S. cost of living. 
General  Discussion 
Walter  Salant  stressed  that the impact  of a change  in a country's  ex- 
change  rate  on its exports  depends  on cost changes  as well  as price  changes. 
Whether  the main impact will be on costs or prices, in turn, depends 
greatly  on the industrial  organization  of the exporting  industry  and on its 
importance  as a world supplier.  In the extreme  case of a small country 
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devaluation  could increase  exports  without  creating  any price advantage 
for that country's  exporters  relative  to others.  The world  price  measured 
in foreign  currency  would be unchanged,  but wheat production  would 
become  more profitable  in the devaluing  country  because  the spread  be- 
tween  the price  and the production  costs, both measured  in domestic  cur- 
rency,  would  increase  and more  would  be exported,  even though  the price 
in foreign  currencies  did not fall. In an oligopolistic  industry  in which  the 
demand  for the country's  exports  is not infinitely  elastic,  however,  exports 
are not likely to be encouraged  without  a cut in the price measured  in 
foreign  currencies.  Both the cost and the price  effects  must be taken into 
account,  Salant  concluded. 
James  Duesenberry  felt that Salant's  distinction  between  price  and cost 
effects  or supply  and  demand  responses  had  general  applicability.  The elas- 
ticity estimates  are really  a compound  of supply  and demand  elasticities. 
A cost advantage  may  enable  one country  to capture  an entire  market  for 
a standardized  product,  a development  that would present  a case of tre- 
mendous  elasticity. 
When  the commodity  is not standardized,  suppliers  who get a cost ad- 
vantage  from  devaluation  may  use it to lower  prices  or to improve  quality 
in ways  that  are  not measurable.  Quality  change  tends  to make  the statistics 
understate  elasticity.  Producers  in the home country  have to decide  how 
much  to respond  to tougher  world  competition  by cutting  their  prices  or 
improving  their  quality.  The amount  of that response  will depend  in part 
on the strength  of demand  and capacity  utilization  in the domestic  econ- 
omy. All of these decisions  influence  the impact on trade, Duesenberry 
concluded. 
Thomas  Juster  felt that price  elasticities  that are calculated  on the unit 
value  measures  of prices  are  likely  to be underestimated.  He reported  that 
when  Robert  Lipsey  of the National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  devel- 
oped product  categories  by technical  specifications,  he found  much  larger 
elasticity  responses  than  had been  obtained  with  the standard  definition  of 
gross  categories  and unit values. 
Juster  also suggested  a way to reconcile  large  price  elasticities  with the 
absence  of dramatic,  visible  effects  of devaluation  in the time series  data: 
The  effects  may  be eroded  by differential  rates  of productivity  growth  in the 
various  countries.  For example,  annual increases  in productivity  are so 
much  higher  in Japan  than in the United States  that the U.S. advantage 
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exchange  rate is important  and yet it can be drowned  out in the data. 
Moreover,  if these big differences  in productivity  growth  are recognized, 
they will weaken  the response  to devaluation;  Japanese  automobile  firms, 
for example,  will not slacken  their  sales efforts  in the U.S. market  if they 
expect  to regain  their  competitive  position  in three  or four years. 
R. J. Gordon  suggested  alternatively  that  rapid  adjustments  of costs and 
prices  in the domestic  economy  following  an exchange  rate  move may off- 
set the large elasticities.  There  are classical  examples  of rapid  price  level 
adjustments  after  devaluation,  as in Australia,  when  the 31 percent  devalu- 
tion of 1949  was followed  by an increase  of over  40 percent  in Australian 
prices  relative  to world prices  over the next three or four years.  Gordon 
underlined  Cairncross'  remark  about  the impact  of sterling  devaluation  in 
stimulating  British  wage inflation,  as another  example. 
Branson  and Stephen  Magee  noted, and Gordon  agreed,  that the cost- 
push impact of devaluation  is likely to be particularly  strong in small 
countries  but less pronounced  for the United  States. 
Arthur  Okun suggested  that the outlook for increases  in U.S. oil im- 
ports should be distinguished  from the issue of how much difference  the 
devaluation  makes. 
Franco  Modigliani  and Branson  expressed  concern  that cyclical  income 
effects  and price  responses  were  not distinguished  in the results  Klein pre- 
sented, which showed no net improvement  in the U.S. trade balance. 
They  found  it hard  to understand  how real  U.S. imports  in 1972  could be 
stimulated  by NEP, as Klein's  Table  2 suggests,  in light of the devaluation 
and the estimated  stimulus  to real GNP of only $1.5 billion. Magee re- 
ported  his estimate  that the cyclical  effect-growth in U.S. output more 
rapid  than that of our trading  partners-would subtract  $2.5  billion from 
our  trade  balance  in 1972.  Branson  quoted  from  a LINK study  (see  note 4, 
pages  62-63) in which  Klein  and  his associates  expressed  their own suspi- 
cions  that  the estimates  of price  sensitivity  were  too small.  Branson  felt  that 
Magee's  empirical  results  offered  solid confirmation  of that intuitive  feel- 
ing. 